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ABSTRACT ENGLISH 
 
The contemporary Nigerian society is characterized by violent conflicts over 
ethnicity and religion, most especially in the Northern states of the country. 
Widespread violence and simultaneous sporadic and reprisal attacks have 
culminated into high level of insecurity and uncertainty to the core continued 
existence of Nigeria as a federal state. The recurring violent attacks have become 
a major phenomenon in day to day socio-political discourse in Nigeria. Many 
scholars opined, that, the major causes of the upheaval is a result of continues 
government neglect to address key issues at the point of incubation and as well 
lack of good governance. And to a larger extent, some scholars are already 
predicting civil war and the eventual disintegration of Nigerian society. The 
nature and composition of Nigerian state is both vital and central to the nature of 
various relationships that exist within it. The primary objective of this thesis is to 
show the multi-ethnic and multi-religious complexity and diversity of Nigerian 
society with the aim of establishing the possible advantages and the needless 
domination or contradictory co-existence among its various groups. This thesis is 
divided into five chapters, with each section focusing on a different subject in 
relation to ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria. Chapter one provides a general 
introduction about the topic and the content of the thesis as a whole. Chapter Two 
reviews the existing literatures, while chapter three deals with various cases of 
ethno-religious violence in Nigeria. Following on from this, chapter four 
highlights the different phases of the conflicts, the actors involved and the overall 
impact of the conflict. The final chapter is dedicated to offering some possible 
solutions and examining what a way forward through the conflicts would look 
like. Therefore, this thesis focuses on the ethno-religious crises that have, despite 
all democratization efforts, become a major setback in an attempt to nation 
building and to demystify their causes and offer possible solutions. 
ABSTRACT GERMAN 
Die gegenwärtige Gesellschaft Nigerias ist charakterisiert durch gewaltsame 
Konflikte um Ethnizität und Religion, vor allem in den nördlichen Staaten des 
Landes. Weitverbreitete Gewalt und gleichzeitige gegenseitige Übergriffe 
kulminierten in einem hohen Grad an Unsicherheit und gefährden die Existenz 
des Bundesstaates Nigeria. Die sich wiederholenden gewalttätigen Angriffe 
wurden ein großes Phänomen in dem täglichen sozio-politischen Diskurs in 
Nigeria. Viele Forscher sind der Meinung, dass der Hauptgrund für diesen 
Umbruch das Resultat der Vernachlässigung von Kernfragen am Beginn dieser 
Entwicklung durch die Regierung war, und auch vom Fehlen einer „good 
governance“. Im weiteren Sinne prognostizieren einige Forscher einen 
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Bürgerkrieg und die etwaige Desintegration der nigerianischen Gesellschaft. Die 
Natur und Zusammensetzung des nigerianischen Staates ist vital und zentral für 
die Natur der verschiedenen Verbindungen, die innerhalb des Staates existieren. 
Die primäre Aufgabe dieser Arbeit ist es, die multi-ethnische und multi-religiöse 
Komplexität und Diversität der nigerianischen Gesellschaft darzustellen, mit dem 
Ziel mögliche Vorteile, und die unnötige Dominanz oder kontradiktorische Ko-
existenz unter ihren verschiedenen Gruppen aufzuzeigen. Diese Arbeit ist in fünf 
Kapitel unterteilt, jede Sektion legt ein Augenmerk auf verschiedene Themen in 
Relation zu den ethno-religiösen Konflikten in Nigeria. Das erste Kapitel gibt eine 
generelle Einführung in das Thema und den Inhalt der Thesis als Ganzes. Kapitel 
Zwei gibt einen Überblick über die bestehende Literatur, während Kapitel drei 
verschiedenen Fällen von ethno-religiöser Gewalt in Nigeria behandelt. Kapitel 
vier beleuchtet die verschiedenen Phasen der Konflikte, die involvierten Akteure 
und den allgemeinen Impakt des Konflikts. Das Abschlusskapitel ist möglichen 
Auswegen gewidmet und untersucht wie ein Ausweg aus den Konflikten aussehen 
könnte. Daher fokussiert diese Arbeit auf ethno-religiöse Krisen die, trotz aller 
Bemühungen um Demokratisierung, ein starker Rückschritt im Versuch der 
Formung einer Nation darstellen und versucht die Gründe dafür zu 
entmystifizieren und mögliche Lösungen anzubieten. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
Since the 1980s, both ethnic and religious crises have bedeviled Nigerian society, 
most especially the Northern part. Of the 19 states that constitute Northern 
Nigeria there is virtually no state that has not witnessed one form of crisis or 
another. Since the middle of 1980s the deluge of violence has continued to 
increase, and consequently has led to many losses of lives and properties. This 
violence has continued to illustrate ethnic and religious colorations, and delineate 
clear manifestation of criminality and frustration. This results from poor 
governance, resultant lack of hope and sociological and economical alienation, 
linked to wide spread poverty and unemployment. However, there are also others 
factors whose identity and character are somehow difficult to define. 
This factor has resulted in lost lives and loss of properties, some people sustained 
injuries of various degrees, some lost all they had and properties worth millions of 
Naira
1
 were either destroyed or looted. Others were permanently displaced and 
psychologically depressed. These crises have created enormous tension and a 
general threat to security among citizens and as well resulted to violation of the 
rights of citizens. Many people feel disgruntled or unjustly treated as a result of 
lack of justice or failure of the state to prosecute perpetrators and agitators of 
these crises
2
.  
It is known fact that ethno-religious conflicts has become a common feature of the 
Nigerian society, despite the enormous human and financial resources committed 
to judicial, extra-judicial and administrative panels of enquiry and investigation 
into remote and immediate causes of the conflicts. Yet, ethno-religious conflicts 
                                                          
1
 Naira is a name for Nigerian currency. 
2
 Yau, 1997 p. 149 
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have become a mainstay within the Nigerian polity. Some notable studies
3
  among 
others have attributed the root causes of ethno-religious conflicts among groups in 
Nigeria to numerous factors, such as: the ways and manners of propagating 
religions; mistrust and suspicions between various religious and ethnic groups; 
and ignorance and intolerance due to self-centeredness among the various 
groups
4
. Other scholars opined the blame to be on Nigeria’s colonial history and 
as well on the pluralistic nature of Nigerian state, claiming that the country’s 
deepening ethno-religious conflicts are fallout of a continued feeling of distrust 
between the various units of the country. 
Some of the contending issues that generate fierce confrontations include those 
that are fundamental to the existence and legitimacy of the state, upon which 
contending groups tend to apply repudiation in a, “winner takes all strategy”, 
which includes the absolute control of state power, resource allocation and 
citizenship
5
. This, as a result, deeply divides the most fragile states and makes 
them unstable; by all ramifications, there are fewer points of convergence and 
consensus among various groups than are required to effectively mitigate or 
contain the centrifugal forces that can tear the society apart
6
. 
The major defect of all the factors identified as responsible for ethno-religious 
conflicts in Northern Nigeria is that they merely cover the root causes and as a 
result they recur with a higher level of sophistication than they hitherto occurred
7
. 
Therefore, it is important to mention at this juncture that most conflicts that are 
assumed to be religious are fundamentally linked to causes other than religion. 
The propensity of identifying some ethnic groups with a particular religion easily 
gives credence for the use of religion for the manipulation of other differences. 
                                                          
3
 Nnoli, 1994, Maguballc, 1969, and Ochoche, 2002 
4
 Olukoju, 1997 
5
 E. Eghosa, 2011  
6
 Ibid. 
7
  Abdullateef  
3 
 
Though there are conflicts that are distinguished as religious in Northern Nigeria 
most scholars accentuated the conflict situation from the point of view of conflict 
assessment, thereby focusing mainly on the structures, actors and dynamics 
thereof. This undoubtedly explains why it was easy to identify the conflict at the 
superficial point, which, however attempts to mostly define the relationships of 
the actors either by ethno-religious affiliation or the principal character of the 
leading actors
8
. 
This conflict context served as a motivation for the author of this thesis to identify 
and analyze the ethno-religious conflicts in Northern Nigeria. This research will 
also critically examine the various factors responsible for ethno-religious 
conflicts/violence in Northern Nigeria and suggest ways as to how they can be 
effectively managed and subsequently averted in the future. To achieve its main 
task, this research will use case studies of ethno-religious conflicts/violence in 
Northern Nigeria, these cases will include: the Jos crises, Kaduna, Kano, 
Maitastine disturbances (Kano, Borno, Adamawa), and Boko Haram (Borno, 
Bauchi). These incidences in various states across the North are selected because 
of their peculiarities, and intensity of violence that occurred within them, and also 
in relation to how strategic and important these states are in Nigeria as a whole. 
For better understanding of what constitutes the area of this research, the 
following map shows Northern Nigeria and the focal points of the research. 
                                                          
8
 Ochoche, 2002 
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This is map of Nigerian showing the Muslim states where shari’ah law has been 
adopted (that are profiled in the thesis). 
Source: http://www.nairaland.com/383418_shariah-nigeria-map. Sited 06/06/2011 
1:1. Understanding Roots Causes of Conflicts in Nigeria 
Ethno-religious conflicts and violence in Nigeria dates back to British colonial 
rule after the conquest and partitioning of what would later become the 
protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria. Nigeria was born out of the 
amalgamation of the two protectorates in 1914 with little or no regard at all for 
the ethnic groupings. The partitioning, however paved the way for separate 
developments among various ethnic units. This form of division was mainly for 
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the interest of the colonial masters
9
. They ignored the interest of the indigenous 
people and as such failed to pay attention to the religious, cultural, political 
differences and inequalities that existed among people long before the colonizers 
arrived. Instead, they resorted to the employment of the callous and infamous 
principle of “divide and rule” which wholly served and killed the aspirations of 
other people. Evidently, this can be seen even in the formation of the security 
agencies, including the armed forces, which served as a standing force for the 
protection of the interests of the colonial trading companies
10
.  
The post-independence governments did very little despite the concerted effort of 
the nationalists to propagate the concept of oneness or “unity in diversity”11. But 
instead, tribalism, nepotism, and corruption become their trademark. Tribalism 
and regional interest became primary to national interest among the elitist 
political class as national issues where pushed to the background for the interest 
of the politicians. Disunity and constant disagreement in the Federal House and 
the insolent disregards for the unity of the nation by the political elites provided 
an awaited opportunity for some military officers to take over in a coup d’état in 
January 1966. 
The emergence of the military in the Nigerian politics paved the way for more 
conflicts rather than solving the hitherto described problems; this resulted in 
mistrust and misunderstanding of the intents of the then head of military who was 
also the president, Aguiyi Ironsi
12. Ironsi’s regime was marked by high level 
tensions and suspicions due the circumstances that surrounded the 1966 military 
coup which brought Ironsi into power. Ironsi had tried in many ways, most 
especially at the federal level, to legislate against the divisive tendencies in the 
country in bringing about the expected national unity and co-existence in the 
                                                          
9
Nwolise, 1992 
10
 Imoghe, 2003 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Ibid. 
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entity called Nigeria
13
. Aguiyi Ironsi was killed in what is referred as the counter 
coup in 1966 and series of combined political, economic and ethnic factors led to 
the Nigerian civil war (Biafra war), which put the unity of the nation to a test
14
. 
Since the end of the Civil War in 1970, Nigeria has experienced conflicts of 
varying proportions and origins of both inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic respectively. 
However, the focus of this research is narrowed to the ethno-religious conflicts in 
the Northern part of Nigeria. There are many of cases ethno-religious conflict in 
Nigeria, but the introduction of sharia
15
 legal system across the Northern states 
has introduced a new dimension to the prevalent impending religious violence in 
Nigeria. The Muslims justify its introduction as part of the dividend of 
democracy, while Christians see it as a contrary to the spirit of secularism as 
provided in section 10 of the 1979 and 1999 constitutions, which states that ‘the 
government of the federation or of a state shall not adopt any religion as a state 
religion’. The above highlights the fact the real problem in Nigeria is not so much 
of ethnic differences, secularity or religiosity, but fear of political dominance of 
one ethnic or religious group by another.  
1:2. The concept of religion 
The term religion derived its name from the Latin word religare (which implies to 
read or pursue together; the same origin goes to legible and intelligent), or rather 
more like and generally accepted from the term religare (to tie back, to find fast). 
But modern scholars like Tom Harpur and Joseph Cambell favor the derivation 
from ligare “bind, connect”, probably from a prefixed re-ligare, that is (again) + 
ligare or “to reconnect”, which was made prominent by St. Augustine, following 
the interpretation of Lactantius
16
. Religion is value-based; as such, people are 
                                                          
13
 Ibid. 
14
 Oluleye, 1985  
15
 Sharia is an Islamic legal system. 
16
 Harpur, 2000 
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usually emotionally attached to it and less tolerant of any unwelcome criticism 
upon it. 
Religion has evoked man since time immemorial to attempt to work out their 
relationship with supernatural beings or powers often regarded as God(s). 
Absolute to this regard is the interaction between religion and the society within 
which it functions. Subsequently, this has changed due to the divisions that 
existed among various human groups, and as such religion has become a major 
influence in politics and crises, thereby playing a significant role in the entire 
societal process, especially in religious societies. For the Romans, religion meant 
being tied back, staying connected with ancestral customs and beliefs, a kind of 
loyalty; among Christians, the word would originally stand for being tied back, 
connected to God. On the other hand, religion in Arabic and Islamic literature is 
referred to ‘din’. In is literal meaning, din means obedient, being in debt, restoring 
ones rights, adopting as a habit, forcing, calling to account, managing, rewarding 
or punishing, serving, lending and so on. Muslim theologians have described din 
as the set of principles reveal by God through prophets for mankind to follow by 
free will in order to acquire happiness in both worlds (here and the hereafter)
17
. It 
can also be seen as a community of persons united by faith, united by a search for 
“the divine”, and defined by its manner of confronting the problems of human 
existence. 
It is imperative to mentioned that, the definitions and perceptions accorded to 
religion by people have not only differed from one historical epoch to another, but 
have also varied from one conventional wisdom to another. It is against this 
background that Marx perceived religion as the “opium of the mass” or in other 
term as the “sigh of the oppressed”. According to Marx religion is not only a 
mental obstruction but also an immaterial object of drowsiness. He further 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
16
 Lactantius is Latin-speaking native of North Africa; he was a pupil of Arnobius and taught rhetoric in various 
cities of the Eastern Roman Empire. 
17
 http://www.islamanswers.net/religion/west.htm  
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buttressed that religion not only blurs the true class consciousness and rational 
ability of masses but further injects them an aura and ecstasy
18
. 
The aforementioned discourse has portrayed religion as a concept or an ideology 
that belonged to the past phase of human development. In reality, however, 
despite man’s supersonic advancement in science and technology, religion still 
plays a very vital role to existence of some societies. People are converting to 
various religions and religious tension is rising to unprecedented level. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union for example necessitated the return to religion among 
many former communist societies. All of these explained why Western theories 
antagonistic towards religion are flawed, as the perceived value of religion is once 
again on the rise and more people are turning to it in mass every day. Religion is 
understood in this research as the search inherent in man for the unfulfilled desire 
for infinity. 
1:3. The concept of violence 
The word “violence” comes from the Latin verb violare. It comprises a range of 
meanings, including “to force”, “to injure”, “to dishonor”, and “to violate”.  For 
the purpose of this research, it is imperative to highlight the importance of this 
definition to human interaction and not to the broad applicability of the term 
“violence” to occurrences to other natural disasters like storms, earthquakes or the 
predatory behavior of animals. As humans, we engage in violence when we use 
force to injure or dishonor an individual of group of persons intentionally. There 
is another possible derivation, from the Latin adjective ‘violentus’, which means 
‘forcible, vehement, violent, impetuous and boisterous’19. The Princeton 
Cognitive Science laboratory defines violence as ‘an act of aggression (as one 
against another who resist); a turbulent state resulting in injuries and destructions; 
                                                          
18
 Raines, 2002 
19
  Aliyu, 2009 
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ferocity: the property of being wild or turbulent”20. However, many opined that, 
violence is an integral part of man’s existence and a common occurrence in 
human societies. 
Since time immemorial, man has learned to intimidate, dominate, exploit, coerce 
and terrorize his fellow men through means of violence or the threat of violence; 
all in the pursuit of power, material gain, or in order to impose a particular 
doctrine, ideology or worldview, what the Germans call ‘weltanschauung’21. 
Violence has been used in many ways with different names, intentions and 
justifications in order to establish a sacred order, in the name of justice and 
righteousness, and in the name of fear, anguish, despair, and indignation. Human 
institutions have been founded, built, consolidated and destroyed by means of 
violence. The present political and socioeconomic state of the world has been 
significantly shaped by war. 
The comprehensive and preferred definition is that of Galtung, who defines 
violence beyond physical and psychological dimension but also as an “avoidable 
insult to basic human needs”22. Galtung emphasizes the hidden or in his own term 
“structural” dimension of violence caused by political or economic structures of 
exploitation and inequality
23
. However, while violence may be physical or non-
physical its immediate target may be either humans or material structures, and its 
ultimate goal is usually to destroy the existence or degrade the dignity of persons 
of group of persons. This definition is considered to be more comprehensive and 
relevant to this research. 
                                                          
20
 Peters, 1994 
21
 Weltanschauung is a German word for philosophy of life, something which people hold dear to their life or    
existence. 
22
  Steger, 2003 
23
 Ibid. 
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1:4. The concept of religious conflict 
Religious conflicts and violence implies disputes or disagreement based on 
differences in faith. However, religious conflicts in the Nigerian context are much 
more than that as they are mostly associated with ethnicity or ethnic differences. 
And also to a larger extent, ethnic conflict usually revolves around resource 
control as most conflicting parties have different distinct cultural identities. 
Interestingly, this form of conflict is not restricted to any specific geo-political 
region of Nigeria or any part of the world
24
. Religious violence is a term that 
covers all areas religion, either as the subject or object of individual or collective 
violent behavior. Significantly, it covers both violence by religiously motivated 
individuals or religious groups and institutions of all kinds, be it different sects or 
secular targets
25
. Religious violence like any other type of violence is inherently a 
cultural driven (?) whose aim entirely depended on contextual beliefs. More often 
than not, religious violence places more emphasis on symbolic representation of 
beliefs. 
Religious conflicts are a recurring phenomena thereby not only affecting the 
security but also the well-being of many countries across the globe. Recent 
studies show that, societies that are divided along religious lines are more prone to 
intense and prolonged conflict than societies facing problems of political, 
territorial and ethnic divisions
26
. This explains the beliefs among many believers 
that it is only through strict adherence to the ethics of religion that one can attain 
self-purification and achieve divine acceptance in the life beyond
27
. Religious 
beliefs and convictions are mostly held very strongly by its followers, in fact, to 
many, it’s a matter of life and death. Religion also serves as a convenient way of 
dividing and differentiating people most especially in regards to resource control. 
                                                          
24
 Aliyu, 2009 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Reynal-Querol, 2002 
27
 Ibid. 
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The world is characterized by many flash points of religious tensions and 
conflicts, most especially in recent times. In India for example, constant clashes 
between Hindus and Muslims and have frequently led to insecurity not only in the 
country but in the sub-region as well, mostly especially in Pakistan and 
Bangladesh. The horrors of religious violence can also be seen in countries like 
Northern Ireland, Lebanon, Sudan and the former Yugoslavia. The occurrence of 
religious violence does not only manifest among different religious groups but 
also the followers of the same religion. This for example is notable in Northern 
Ireland between Christian denomination of Catholics and Anglicans. Similarly, 
there also exists a rivalry between the Muslims sects of Sunni and Shi’a in Iraq, 
Yemen and Saudi Arabia where there have also been tense and bloody 
sometimes
28
. 
It is no doubt that Nigeria is one of the largest and most influential country in the 
third world, but sadly Nigeria has been in the news in the last 20 years as the 
major arena of religious violence and aggression, some even termed it worse than 
Sudan and Somalia. Religion has played a significant role in dividing Nigerians 
between Christians and Muslims, most especially in the Northern part and also 
contributes immensely to the long standing inter-religious conflict that has 
bedeviled the entity called Nigeria. The religious violence was fuelled by the 
ethnic tension that previously existed among the various tribal groups. This 
tension was fuelled by mistrust and suspicion which was a by-product or 
marginalization and the tussle for power among the various groups.  The religious 
crisis in various parts of Nigeria has continued to pose serious threats to its 
national security
29
. Apart from the huge loss of lives, property and the 
displacement of citizens, the problem has taken on a dimension with regards to 
the choice of targets, sophistication of weaponry and high level form of 
asymmetric strategies
30
. 
                                                          
28
 Aliyu, 2009 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Ja'afaru, 2001 
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The availability and usage of weapons during such crises “encourages reprisal 
killings, which spark off new rounds of violence between warring groups”31. This 
situation has over time gone beyond the control of Nigerian security agencies, and 
as such the restoration of law and other has become a major challenge of both 
state and the federal governments. This however, resulted in a rapid escalation of 
the conflict in various parts of the country and as well exposes the weakness of 
the government in handling the situation. Apart from loss of lives and property, 
businesses are also struggling to survive due to lack of investment directly 
resulting from lack of security. 
Nigeria is characterized by a number of conflicts arising mostly from religious 
crises which has been affecting many parts of the country since 1980s. But the 
irony of it was that, these conflicts become prone to the Nigerian entity during the 
democratic dispensations. It has been estimated that since the transition to civilian 
rule in May 1999, no fewer than ten thousand lives have been lost to religious 
violence
32
. In 1999, when the country came out of 15 years of long military 
dictatorship, the hopes and aspirations of the majority of Nigerians were high that 
democracy would restore political instability, print-jump the economy and 
ultimately improve the wellbeing of Nigerians. But at 2004, it was estimated that 
some 10,000 people had been killed in clashes between rival ethnic and religious 
across the country while 800,000 others were displaced from their homes
33
. Yet 
the number has quadrupled over recent times. Many of these conflicts were 
mainly between Christians and Muslims, even though, there are instances of same 
sects engaging in violent conflict due to different interpretations of the holy 
books. Notably, the conflict between Christians and Muslims are the most 
frequent, for example, the crisis in Shagamu in Ogun state, Lagos, Kano, Kaduna, 
Plateau, Bauchi, Yobe and Borno states by different groups, and most notorious is 
the Boko Haram. This conflict has hugely shaken the unity of Nigeria and raises 
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  National War College, 2006. This is report from War College of the Nigerian Army.. This situation 
32
 Presidential Committee, 2002 
33
 Collier, 2008 
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many questions about the oneness of Nigeria. The violence has also led to people 
calling for disintegration of Nigeria.  
The recent religious crises were highly motivated by the introduction of Shari’ah 
system in some Northern states of Nigeria. Kaduna state for example has 
witnessed several religious crises in the last two decades, few among them are 
Zango Kataf (1992), Kafanchan (1999), Shari’ah crises (2000). Also there were 
numerous violent clashes in Kano and the dreaded Boko Haram between Borno, 
Yobe and Bauchi which will be discuss extensively in the coming chapters.  
1:5 Research Question 
The primary research question for this thesis is: why is Nigeria so prone to ethno-
religious violence and how it can be stopped or managed?. 
Other sub-questions or secondary questions of the research are: 
1. In what ways does religious violence affect Nigeria as a whole? 
2. What are the main factors that necessitated religious violence in Nigeria? 
3. What are the associated securities challenges facing the Nigerian government? 
4. What strategies could be adopted to minimize or neutralize the impact of this 
instability on Nigeria’s national security? 
5. What role does religion play in Nigerian polity?  
1:6 Research Method 
This research on ethno-religious violence in Northern Nigeria shall be based on a 
literature review and the study and analysis of related documents. To compliment 
this thesis, documents from government establishment, agencies and parastatals, 
media house, archive and periodicals will be consulted. In addition, both print and 
14 
 
electronic materials related to ethno-religious violence in Nigeria will be 
consulted. (Does the author have any personal experience of the situation, if so 
mention this.) 
1:7 Significance of the study 
The significance of this thesis is to highlight the ethno-religious violence in 
Northern Nigeria and to educate people on it.. This thesis can thus serve as guide 
to understanding the religious violence in Nigeria and as well can potentially be a 
useful guidebook for the policymakers on how to approach and tackle religious 
violence not only in Nigeria but also in other part of the world. Finally, (by 
expanding the body of knowledge and analysis on ethno-religious violence?) it 
can be a resource to other researchers and scholars for future research on similar 
issues. 
1:8 Scope and Limitations 
This thesis will cover the period from 1980 to 2011. This period was chosen in 
order to have clear understanding of the dynamics of ethno-religious violence in 
Nigeria. Special emphases will be given to the most recent conflicts in Northern 
Nigeria, most notably, the Boko Haram sect. 
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Chapter Two 
2.1: Literature Review 
 
This chapter will mainly review and discuss the most vital and relevant literature 
written in relevance to research question of this thesis. The relationship between 
religion and violence and as well the factors responsible for ethno religious 
violence in Nigeria will be dealt with in this chapter. Discourses on these vital 
topics have become not only necessary, but essential for better understanding of 
religious violence not only in Nigeria but in the world at large.  
This chapter will use mainly secondary sources of literature like articles, books 
and contemporary journals related to the thesis theme. Numerous books and 
articles have been written on these particular topics and as such critical reviews of 
these sources are also available for further studies. In order to achieve this, all 
efforts will be concentrated on conceptualizing the various aspects of the thesis 
for the enhancement and better understanding of the issues that will be raised in 
this research. This chapter will also explore all variables of the subject matter with 
a view to establishing the relationship between them. And lastly, this chapter will 
provide an overview of other research works relevant to this field in order to 
clarify and fill the gap between them. 
2.2: Violence and Religion 
Violence caused by religious and ethnic differences is often referred to as ethno-
religious violence. The act of violence perpetrated by groups and movements has 
inevitably brought into focus the need to critically study and understand what 
really constitutes ethno-religious conflicts. Numerous groups are linked to one 
religious organization or another for attention. 
16 
 
For example, in his books: The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts 
the Secular State (1993) and Global Rebellion: Religious Challenges to the 
Secular State (2008),  Mark Juergensmeyer painted a provocative picture of the 
emerging religious revolutionaries altering the political landscape of the Middle-
East, South Asia, Central Asia and, to an extent, Eastern Europe. The impassioned 
leaders in Maghreb regions and of Palestine, political rabbis in Israel, militant 
Sikhs in India and the triumphant Catholic clergy in Eastern Europe are all actors 
in Juergensmeyer’s area study of explosive growth of religious movements that 
opposed Western values and ideas of secular nationalism
34
. He asserted that,  
Groups such as Hamas, Khaliatan Movement, Christian Identity, and Jewish 
Right Wing have used violence to draw attention to them and also articulate the 
concerns of those within their wider cultures
35
. 
This type of violent act is often considered by its adherents as extreme but yet 
understandable and ultimately justifiable. 
The World Council of Churches’ Conference, Eckerd College, St. Petersburg, 
Florida, February, 8-12-2002 was a conference organized by international 
fellowship of Christian Churches  built on the foundation of encounter, dialogue 
and collaboration. 
The discourse of the conference was centered on how some religious groups on 
one hand condemn violence and other on the other encourages and even justifies 
its usage. In further discourse, the conference suggest that, 
Religious traditions can be resources for building peace and the same time, 
religious communities often play a role of advocating and justifying violence. In 
the face of structural violence, religious traditions should help us to overcome the 
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lust for power, control and possession of material goods that are the driving 
impulses of violence and violent systems
36
 
The conference further highlights key elements that characterize the relationship 
between violence and religion. These elements are: 
Silence: Religious communities often maintain silence in the face of violence and 
off-course there are many reasons for doing so. Some of these reasons include: the 
concern for their own communities and its structures, and the role of helping their 
followers to feel satisfied in the status quo and in their own material prosperity 
without a concern for the marginalized
37
. 
Sanctification: More often religious communities justify the use of violence by 
the state or extra state entities or by objectives of the state and the 
textual/canonical legitimization of violence against women. 
Expansion: Almost in all cases, religious communities use violence solely for the 
purpose of spreading themselves or expanding their growth. For example, the 
crusade campaign, Islamic holy wars, Hindu riots just to mention a few. 
Image of God: Some religions portray a violent image of God just like the 
Sango
38
 the God of thunder and other deities in various religions. This violent 
image of the divine has created problems and implication for the self-
understanding of believers
39
.  
Image of self: A religious tradition has no doubt promoted violence through 
framing of their followers in terms of the ‘lesser worth’ of others.  
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The above list exposes some of the problematic aspects of the relationship 
between religion and violence, while the following point to constructive forms of 
engagement. 
Unmasking/opposing: Religious communities have played a role in opposing 
violence both within their community and others most especially when others are 
injured. 
Models of Non-violence: Every religion in this world claimed to be peaceful and 
in earnest preaches the gospel of peace and non-violence
40
. 
Limiting Violence: Religions have often played a significant role in checking the 
levels of violence or ‘humanizing it’. In most cases of our traditions, limited use 
of violence is permitted for the defense of good but with the understanding that 
we are falling short of the ideal and thus need forgiveness
41
. 
It is interesting to note that, the perpetrators of this violent act are rarely different 
from the orthodox and Islamic groups or mainstream religious groups. However, 
it’s not their spirituality that is unusual but their religious ideas, cultural context 
and world views. The contemporary emergences of new religious movements are 
in reality, religious responses to social situation and the expression deeply held 
convictions. 
Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2001, authored by Mark Juergensmeyer is noted 
here. This book strongly affirmed that, analyzing the connection between religion 
and violence involves examining a variety of distinct issues and relationships. 
However, violence is not a direct result of religious individuals or groups but in 
another dimension, religion creates more room and avenue for bloodshed.  
Furthermore, the notion, ideas and justification for violence are also not a 
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monopoly of one religion but all religions in one way or another
42
. Most of the 
recent violent religious assaults on public, national or international scene are 
attributed to the following reasons: 
1. Perception of an anti-religious international political conspiracy. 
2. Enthronement of an oppressive global economic order mentioned by Bin Laden, 
Shimkyo and some Christian Militias
43
. 
These trends have further fuelled the growth and emancipation of various groups 
of violent religious sects which continue to threaten the peace and security of not 
only Nigeria but the world at large.  
Still in his book, Juergensmeyer explore the use of violence by marginal groups 
within five major religious traditions: Christianity (reconstruction theology and 
the Christian identity movement, abortion clinics attacks, the Oklahoma city 
bombing, and Northern Ireland); Judaism (Baruch Goldstein, the assassination of 
Rabin and Kahane); Islam (World Trade Center bombing, Hamas, and Al-Qaida); 
Sikhism (the assassination of Indira Gandhi and Beant Singh) and Buddhism 
(Aun Shinrikyo and the Tokyo subway gas attack). Juergensmeyer had 
interviewed many participant and advocates of violence notably among are; Mike 
Bray, Yoel Lerner, Mahmud Abouhalima, Simranjit Singh Mann and many more, 
but he is more concern and interested  in ‘culture of violence’ rather than 
individual psychology.  
The second part of the book discusses the common themes and patterns in the 
cultures of violence described above. One of the main themes of violence as 
performance, with symbolism often taking precedence over more strategic 
considerations in such matters as choice of targets and dates; and off-course there 
are connections with religious ritual. Another theme is the planning of violence 
within the context of a cosmic war, a symbolic and transcendent conflict; this is 
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further buttress by the movement’s casualties become martyrs and their opponents 
demonized
44
. Religious violence is consolidated by the nature of the religious 
imagination, which has always had the propensity to project images of comic 
wars. The social tension has also contributed to historical movements that seek 
absolute solutions, and the sense of personal humiliation experienced by men who 
longed to restore integrity that they perceive as lost in the wake of virtually global 
social and political shifts. 
Juergensmeyer concludes Terror in the Mind of God with suggestions, predicting 
that religious violence will become more controversial in the future. He argues 
that ‘the cure for religious violence may ultimately lie in a renewed appreciation 
for religion itself’ and in acknowledgement of in public life45. 
2.3: Religious violence in Nigeria 
This heading will extensively analyze various scholarly works and most 
especially on those literatures that dwell on the factors responsible for religious 
violence in Nigeria. 
Islam in Nigeria: Its Concept, Manifestation and Role in Nation Building is a 
chapter written by Umar, S. M in a book titled Nigeria Since Independence: The 
First Twenty Five Years, by Ashiwaju G. and Abubakar Y. (Published in Ibadan 
by Heinemann in 1989). In this book, Umar pointed out that, there was a crack in 
the edifice of confidence among the Islamic elites by their fellow Muslims
46
. The 
Islamic elites are deeply engrossed in material acquisition, they coined to their 
whims for example the prohibition of usury to suits their economic gain. He also 
opined that the legal manifestation of Islam was destroyed because the so called 
elites could not enforce shariah (Islamic law). Despite the abundance of mosque, 
yet, there was little observance of moral precepts. The Islamic scholars engaged in 
primitive distractions and obstructions. 
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Educational and or intellectual manifestation appears so helpless and important 
that they could not control deviations. In spite of the formation of the Supreme 
Council for Islamic Affairs, richly endowed by the Pakistani, Yusuf Fardi, and the 
Council failed to be effective in instilling sufficient authority in influence over 
their followers. Thus, the baton was passed to students, the unemployed youth and 
exploitative Islamic scholars to protect Islam in the way they knew best
47
. This 
however, coincided with the charismatic Pentecostals who dared further into the 
Muslim North with greater confidence and acquired followers which in turn 
exacerbated worse the matters. This however, brought Christians in the North and 
South together and this mass ecumenical unification raised alarms of immense 
political importance. 
Ethno-Religious Conflicts and The Travails of National Integration in Nigerian’s 
Fourth Republic, is a book written by Lanre Olu-Adeyemi of the Department of 
Political Science and Public Administration, Adekunle Ajasin University, in Ondo 
state of Nigeria. This author ascertained that, the character of the Nigerian state is 
primarily responsible for the deepening ethno-religious violence in Nigeria. The 
plurality of Nigeria incubates constant feeling of distrust and hatred between 
various component units and as well the fear of one group subjugating another. It 
is this pattern of largely discernible ethnic suspicious and intrigues that existed 
prior to independence that consequently let to Nigeria’s first military coup d’état 
of 1966 and the traumatic civil war between 1967 and 1970. This mutual distrust 
also led to the annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential election thereby 
intensifying the never ending problem of ethno-religious violence is presently 
threatening the very fabric of Nigeria’s nascent democracy and to a larger extent 
national existence
48
. 
The so called Nigerian elites have over the years sacrificed stunning opportunities 
for initiating national integration on the altar of short-term whims and caprices 
thereby compounding the problem to magnitude. Consequently, in spite of the 
                                                          
47
 Aliyu, 2009  
48
 Olu-Adeyemi, 2006 
22 
 
creation of more states and local governments, a new constitution and forms of 
governments, yet, the state continue to remain in plague with conflicting interest 
that poses the threat of national disintegration. At the epitome of this discussion is 
the problem of intolerant ethnic diversities and religious view which are 
commonly expressed in the series of violent crises that disorient Nigerian 
politics
49
.  
Ethnic and Religious Violence in Nigeria, Jos: African Center for Democratic 
Governance (AFRGOV) 2001, written by S.G Egwu. He harangued (could be an 
alternate word as you seem to use opined a lot?) in his writing that; 
The constant political, ethnic and religious violence that characterized the 
Nigerian state is attributable to the history and processes inherent in the state 
formation during the colonial and postcolonial era. The Colonial state was the 
foundation upon which the post colonial state was built; therefore, the process of 
ethnic identity formation and the political use to which such identity is put were 
determined by this process. Presently, the Nigerian state, he argues, is a violent 
institution and to a larger extent a crisis generating mechanism because the 
development of a bourgeois nation-state based on respect for human rights, the 
rule of law and the institutionalization of democratic order and governance was 
not the priority of the colonialist in building the Nigerian state
50
. 
Ethnic Nationalities and the Nigeria State: The Dynamics and Challenges of 
Governance in a Plural Nigeria (2002) is a special annual lecture delivered at the 
National institute for Policy and strategic Studies by the former President, retired 
General Ibrahim Babangida. While delivering this lecture, Babangida argued that, 
“While in Nigeria we have been lucky enough to avoid a major conflict between 
the major religious communities, the fact remains that religion and cultural 
diversity is enough justification to see religion and ethnicity as a potential threat”. 
He further asserts that the events within the last half decade have shown that 
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religious and ethnic tensions have been to an unprecedented level of intensity. 
There is no doubt that, the disputes between religion and ethnicity are mostly been 
instigated and manipulated by partisan and electoral interest. However, this 
interrelationship is a key to a better management strategy of ethno-religious 
conflicts in Nigeria
51
. 
The question of Islamic law (shariah) has been lingering since 1978 and over the 
years become a major bone of contention in Nigerian politics. It has become an 
important factor and avenue in which various actors must especially; the 
politicians and sub-religious groups carry out their whims and their so called 
struggle. The situation climaxed into a major struggle and outcry in 1999 when 
Zamfara and other 11 states in the North adopted Islamic law (shariah), to include 
criminal law from its personal law. The Christians however, opposed and 
protested against its implementation and this resulted to mass demonstrations in 
various cities and towns across Nigeria most notable the volatile states like 
Kaduna and Bauchi. 
The implication of these conflicts in Nigeria is no doubt a result of multi-religious 
and cultural differences among various societies. As such, Nigerians should 
accept the differences among its people since there is consensus of agreeing to 
live together. It is only through mutual understanding that the full realization of 
democracy and federalism can be achieved.  
Religion: The Secret Weapon in Resolving Religious-based Conflicts: By Stephan 
D. Hayes. Hayes operates a consultancy firm, he provides clients with public 
relations and business development advice. Until 2005, Hayes worked as a senior 
Vice President of Business Development at Gannon International. Hayes in this 
publication sees religion as central to most of the strife in the contemporary world 
of today. Yet traditional diplomacy’s neglect of religious factors has left most 
especially the West ill-equipped to deal with dimensions of religious conflicts. He 
states that, 
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“Nor have we the ability to counter demagogues like bin Laden or Milosevic who 
manipulate religion for their own purpose”52. He further buttressed that, “In 
Chechnya, Kashmir, Sri Lanka, Kosovo, Nigeria, Indonesia and most visible of 
course, the Middle East, religion is fueling armed conflict. At the same time, it is 
religion itself that holds the best hope for enhanced understanding and 
reconciliation
53
. 
Several studies have been carried out on Ethno-religious violence in Nigeria. In 
this study, I will like to specifically dwell on the Part of Nigeria (role of 
Nigeria?). Previous studies emphasized mostly on the general assumption without 
going deep into the lives of the ordinary citizens in the Northern part of Nigeria. 
They also failed to point out the relationship between deprivation, 
marginalization, exclusion and ethnic and religious crises and how they emanated 
from each other. 
This study will therefore try to fill the gap by identifying the missing links not yet 
studied in ethnic and religious crisis in Northern Nigeria. This research will also 
analyse the long standing domination of Northern Muslims over the Southern and 
Northern Christians which has led stockpiling of arms and weapons on both sides. 
Chapter Three 
3.1: Cases of Ethno-Religious violence in Northern Nigeria 
Ethno-religious conflicts and violence in Northern Nigeria dates back to the pre-
colonial era. The manifestation of (kingdoms like the Kororofa kingdom, the 
Emirate of Kano, the Sokoto Caliphate, and the kanem Borno Empire) had 
severally in one way or the other involved subjugating their neighboring 
communities or ethnic minority groups. The Islamization of most part of Northern 
Nigeria and some part of the South came with a price of waging holy wars on the 
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communities or ethnic minority groups to be converted to Islam. The 1804 Jihad 
of Usman B. Fodio was responsible for Islamization of the whole of the Northern 
part except Kanem Borno Empire where Islam flourished since 9
th
 Century and to 
a larger extends to some part of Southern Nigeria
54
. Besides, boundary disputes 
between adjacent communities or ethnic groups are as old as the history of man. 
Also, the intra-communal and inter ethnic violence and conflicts were intensified 
by the introduction of the slave trade by the callous European Merchants. 
The Establishment of British Administration brought an end to slave trade but 
paved ways to further problems. By its policy of ‘divide and rule’ it deliberately 
and purposely set one ethnic group against another under the guise of securing the 
right of each group to maintain its identity, individuality and chosen form of 
government. Under the policy of indirect rule, minority ethnic groups, particularly 
in the Northern areas, were subjected to the rule of powerful emirs, and to a large 
extent, to their religion with unavoidable resultant resentment. In an effort to 
quench the agitation of Sothern elites against colonial rule, the imperialist 
considered it necessary to incline the power equation in favour of the more 
accommodating Northern political operators. This further led to adoption of 
different system of electoral laws between the North and the Southern part
55
. 
The establishment of a federal form of government in 1954 gave rise to the 
emergence three major dominant groups (Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo), one in each of 
the three geo-political regions. This however, emanated into a new phase of 
ethno-religious violence in the country. This trend transformed into power politics 
among the three regions and as well created ethnic minorities among each of the 
region. Under the policy of Indirect Rule, minority ethnic groups, particularly in 
the Northern areas, were subjected under the powerful emirs and to a larger 
extend, to their religions with unavoidable resultant resentment. To undo or oust 
the other major ethnic groups in the power, each of the regional majority groups’ 
support if not excites minority agitation against the majority groups while 
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blissfully ignoring the same agitation within its own region. The overwhelming 
support of the government in power in the Western Region for the creation of 
Midwest state in 1964 has been categorized by some scholars as an act of political 
maneuver. Besides, there was intense rivalry between the three major political 
groups to capture power in the center
56
. 
3.2: Kano 
Kano has, since colonial times, remained a center of ethnic and religious tension 
which was sometimes aggravated by violence. Most of this violence was between 
Hausa/Fulani Muslims against their Christian counterparts from the Southern part 
of Nigeria. Kano is no doubt the largest industrial and commercial city in 
Northern Nigeria and has remained the center of attractions for migrants of 
various ethnic, religious and national groups since colonial times. It is interesting 
to note that, pre-colonial migrants have physically and culturally integrated and 
assimilated, while modern migrants are finding it difficult or almost impossible to 
integrate. The explanation for this is not far fetched, as the situation was 
encouraged by colonial government’s discrimination and segregation for easy 
implementation of divide and rule policy
57
. 
The establishment of Sabon Gari ward in 1913 further served the racial 
segregation policy of the colonialist. Most migrants settled in Sabon Gari and as 
such both Muslim and Christian settlers were attracted. This settlement was. 
however, the third colonial settlement after Bompai which is a mainly European 
residential and administrative settlement with Asian/Lebanese quarters, located in 
the Western part of the railway station. Sabon Gari settlement was created in 
order for the colonial government to directly administer, within British rule, those 
African-Yoruba, Igbo, Nupe, Hausa, Chadian and other numerous ethnic migrants 
to Kano during the colonial period. This is primarily and intentionally created to 
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serve the divide and rule policy which was based on white racial ascendency
58
.  
This type of settlement further strengthened the powers of the traditional rulers 
(Emirs) and the traditional institutions thereby increased the influence of the 
traditional rulers which led to a greater cohesion among the local population and 
between the traditional bureaucracy and authority of the chiefs. This, however, 
helped in strengthening the importance of local ties, norms, values and customs 
thereby contributing in solidifying the feeling of exclusiveness of the indigenous 
communities.
59
 Migrants therefore find it difficult to get integrated. Consequently, 
these settlements and its surroundings have become flash points and crises prone 
areas since colonial period. 
The first crisis in Kano was a result of colonial manipulation of ethnic and 
regional sentiments to suppress anti-colonial actors. In 1953, the Igbo people were 
attacked in Sabon Gari area I, Kano, however, the crisis was fuelled by a political 
disagreement between the members of Northern People’s Congress NPC 
(Northern political party) and members of Action Group AG (Western-based 
political party). The disagreement rose from a motion moved by a member of 
Action Congress Party, for Nigeria’s independence in 1956 to which the NPC 
bluntly objected, preferring to have it ‘as soon as practicable’60. This 
disagreement however, resulted to a mass protest in Kano against the tour of 
Action Group leaders to Northern Nigeria, Kano in particular. The protest led to 
the killing of 21 Southerners, most of whom were Igbo, also leaving 163 
injured
61
.   
The second crisis came after the fallout of the January 15
th
, 1966 military coup 
d’état led by an Igbo, Major Chukwuemeka Kaduna Nzeogwu, as a result of 
which many prominent Northern politician were killed. The subsequent 
appointment of Major general Agunyi Ironsi on 29 March, 1966 (as the new head 
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of state) was greeted with a large demonstration in Kano. It was estimated that, 
between 100 and 200 Igbos lost their lives in Sabon Gari
62
. 
Numerous crises followed in Kano and it is pertinent at this junction to categorise 
them into specifics.  
3:2.1 Maitatsine Crisis, 1980 
The Maitastine crisis erupted in 1980 and it was a bloody clash between the 
militant followers of Mohammadu Marwa (a.k.a Maitastine) and the Nigerian 
Police Force. The crisis was a result of different interpretation of Islamic 
teachings and an injunction between Maitastine and the orthodox sect. The 
Maitastine group was an unorthodox sect of Islam that rejects acquisition of 
worldly materialism of the main stream sects of Tijanniya/Quadiriya while 
assigning the divine power and authority to its spiritual leader Mohammed 
Marwa, Maitastine
63
. This is considered blasphemy in mainstream Islam. The 
Maitastine or Yan Tastine, were anti-establishment crusaders who challenged 
both Islamic and political authorities. They believed that they were the only true 
and righteous servants of God and dismissed other Muslims as those who had 
gone astray. Their belief revolved around the notion of “Quran only” to the 
exclusion of the Hadith, Sunnah and other universally agreed secondary sources 
of Islamic law, conducts and norms
64
. Maitastine was accused of condemning the 
principles and ethics of Islam as laid down by the Quran and Sunnah and as well 
denouncing the prophethood of Prophet Mohammed
65
. 
The Maitastine disturbances did not start in the 1980s; his fundamental views and 
actions led to his deportation in 1962 by the then Emir of Kano Alhaji 
Mohammed Sanusi. He was later arrested and put to preventive detention in 
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1975
66
. Long before the outbreak of the disturbances, the activities of Maitastine 
had become wary for the people of Kano must especially among the Muslims. It 
was a tale of one incident against another, of one clash against another, one form 
of breach of law and other, peace and tranquility in Kano and its surroundings
67
. 
He was said to have arrested and detained people illegally and indiscriminately; 
some even said that, he had slaughterhouse where he made meat out of people
68
. 
Many women and children were kidnapped and force to work for the group under 
duress.  The main adherents of Maitastine are the almajirai children whom he 
easily indoctrinated through his teachings and fake promises made to them. It is a 
known fact that, the almajirai were considered lowest in the society and as such, 
joining Maitastine gave them a sense of belonging
69
. This impetus gave them the 
motivation wage a war against the people of Kano in order to uplift their status 
and to gain recognition among society. Maitastine was also accused of 
intimidation and molestation of innocent people, particularly his neighbors in Yan 
Awaki Quarters. He forcefully ejected people from their houses and handed over 
the houses to his fanatic followers, he also seized public places like primary 
schools, markets and so on
70
. 
However, the main disturbances started on the 18
th
 December 1980. It broke out 
in Shahuchi playground and later spread to Yan Awaki, Fagge, Koki, Kofar 
Wambai, and later to the entire city.  It took a huge effort and intervention from 
the Nigerian Army to restore normalcy after eight days of blood bath. Many lives 
and properties were lost including members of the police and the Army
71
. 
The Maitastine disturbances emerged at a time when Kano was going through 
political upheavals. The internal crisis of the then People’s Redemption Party 
(PRP), the conflict between the state governor, Alhaji Abubakar Rimi and the 
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Emir of Kano, Alhaji-Ado Bayero, and the political disagreement between the 
state and the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) were among the major crises that 
engulfed Kano at that time.   
The Maitastine disturbances however, led to trading of blame between PRP-
controlled state and the NPN-controlled central government. The federal 
government, through its Tribunal of Inquiry on the crisis, accused the Kano state 
government and in particular the state governor (Alhaji Abubakar Rimi) as well as 
Alhaji Sule Hamma, the secretary to the state government of Kano state, Alhaji 
Aminu Yusuf, the Commissioner of special duties and a host of other officials for 
negligence and to some extend collaboration
72
. The federal tribunal report on 
Maitastine disturbances explicitly reported that: “for Abubakar Rimi to have 
chosen to dine as he himself admitted in evidence, with the emissaries of 
Maitastine-a criminal and a felon-was suggestive of accommodation of Maitastine 
in circumstances unbecoming of a Chief executive”73. 
On her defense, the Kano state government accused and held the federal 
government responsible. It accused the federal government of sponsoring the 
crisis in order to destabilize the state and create room for a declaration of state of 
emergency on the state. “The state government maintained that… the federal 
government was fully aware of the activities of Maitastine and refused to take 
preemptive majors”74. The non cooperation of the Nigerian Police before the 
outbreak of the crisis was attributed to the deliberate negligence by the federal 
government to destabilized the PRP government that has been in opposition to the 
NPN when he said; “There is no doubt that the Police was very much hand in 
gloves with the ruling party and Maitastine must have been seen as a welcome 
irritant for Abubakar Rimi who was giving the NPN a very bloody nose in Kano 
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and beyond”75. These, crises, however provide a picture of state complicity 
towards religious violence. 
3:2.2 Fagge Crisis 1982 
Prior to 1982, religious crisis was a rare phenomenon in Northern Nigeria until 
Kano erupted. The crisis was sparked by the decision of the Anglican Hausa 
Church in Fagge Quarters to build a bigger church within its walled premises
76
. 
The Muslim community around the area objected on the ground that the proposed 
church area was too close to the Fagge Central Mosque. They fought aggressively 
to ensure that the state government did not approve the building, and as expected, 
the state government acted in favor of the Muslims. Despite this effort, the 
Christians felt marginalized and decided to carry on with the construction, and the 
failures of the state government to intervene on the issue provoked a violent 
reaction. This resulted to the burning of three churches in downtown Sabon Gari 
and several other churches were vandalized and destroyed
77
. 
3:2.3 Proposed Visit of Rev. Reinhard Bonnke 1991 
The year 1991, saw again another violent reaction from the Muslim youths 
against the government decision of given permission to the Charismatic 
Movement in Kano to organize a crusade to be chaired by the renowned German 
Evangelist Reinhard Bonnke and some American preachers
78
. This violent 
reaction was necessitated by an earlier government decision, refusing entry of a 
South African Muslim preacher into the country.  
The crusade and the coming of the international Evangelist were massively 
publicized and this attracted the attention of the Muslims who opposed against the 
crusade taking place in Kano. They accused the government of a double standard 
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for failing to grant permission to Sheikh Ahmed Deedat, the South African 
preacher who had wanted to visit Kano
79
 
80
. One preacher was quoted saying “It is 
injustice allowing the German preacher”81. The crusade was only seen as 
provocative to the people of Kano whom consider Kano as a Muslims state but an 
attempt to Christianized the Islamic city or portray is as Christian city. They 
furiously resented the messages in the media advert, that, the Evangelist will 
make the deaf hear, the blind see, cripple walk and the most unsettling to the 
people was the slogan “ Jesus for all by the year 2000”82.   
The Muslims aired their reprisals by sending delegates to the government in order 
to withdraw and provoke the permission granted to the Christians for the crusade. 
On the 13
th
 October, 1991, the proposed day of the crusade, the Muslims held a 
peaceful demonstration in the Emirs palace and later had an emergency prayer at 
the Kofar Mata Eid praying ground. Suddenly, the scenery changed into violence. 
Kano youths went on a rampage thereby destroying churches, looting shops, 
burning of car, hotels, beer parlors and night clubs. The Igbo as usual are the most 
affected as their shops are the most targeted. In retaliation, some Igbo groups 
attacked some Muslims/Hausa houses and Mosque and killed many Hausa found 
in Sabon Gari. This incident was accompanied by mass exodus of people from 
Kano most of whom were the Christian Southerners (Igbo, Yoruba and other 
Christian groups). In one week a considerable number of people fled the city of 
Kano and most of these people viewed themselves as Kano citizens, because they 
had been living there for years. It was unofficially reported that more than five 
hundred lost their lives in places like Sabon Gari, Kofar Mata, Rimin Kebe, 
Tudun wada, Konar Jaba, Kofar Nassarawa, Brigade, Tudun Wada and other 
fringe areas.  Almost all the Christians/Southerners took refuge in Military and 
Police barracks
83
.  
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3:2.4: Beheading of the Kafir (non-believer) 
Another terrible incident happened in December 1994 when a fundamentalist 
Shiite Muslim group brutally beheaded Gideon Akaluka, an Igbo trader who 
allegedly defamed the Holy Quran. Akaluka was accused of using a page of the 
Holy Quran to clean himself after using a restroom. This act however, provoked 
the Muslims and most especially the Shiite group who took the law into their own 
hands by declaring and legitimizing Akaluka’s blood as lawful which means he 
should be killed at all costs
84
. The police interfered when the tension arose 
thereby arresting Akaluka and keeping him in protective custody. But trust the 
Kano people when it comes to this. They were disgruntled and dissatisfied by the 
slow progress of the court proceedings and thereafter; they defied all security 
arrangements and went to the Doron Duste prison, pulled Akaluka out and 
brutally beheaded him. They took the head and paraded it around the city chanting 
‘Allah Akbar’ (Allah is Great)85. The Igbo people maintained their peace by not 
retaliating, however, tension rocked the city and this led to closure of shops, 
businesses were halt to stand still. Many of the non-indigenes fled the city with 
some seeking shelter in police and military barracks. 
In an effort to restore confidence among the non-indigenes, the then Kano state 
government went on manhunt of the Shiite groups. It was alleged that many of the 
Shiite members were secretly and extra-judicially killed. The group claimed that 
about a hundred of its’ own were killed86. 
3:2.5 Sabon Gari Carnage 1995  
Sabo Gari has become a major flashpoint when it comes to ethnic and religious 
violence in Kano. Another crisis erupted in June 1995 between an Igbo trader 
(Arthur Nwankwo) and a Hausa Man (Abubakar Abdu) along Russed Avenue in 
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Sabon Gari
87
.  The fight erupted when an Igbo man pushed a Hausa man into a 
hot pot of vegetable oil. A massive clash occurred among the two tribes, which 
later escalated into ethnic and religious clashes. Official reports put the death toll 
at five but it was widely believed that between 15 to 20 people lost their lives 
during the clashes. Ninety-three persons were seriously injured
88
. Also a total of 
32 vehicles, 81 motorcycles and 49 shops were vandalized. Many Churches and 
Mosques were burnt to ashes. 
3:2.6 Counter-Attack of Shagamu violence 
This incident started in the far away Western part of Nigeria (Yoruba land) in 
August 1999, when the ‘Area Boys’89 hijacked the annual ‘Oro’ festival in 
Shagamu, Osun State, which spark up virtually avoidable conflict between the 
Yoruba and the Hausa. At the aftermath of the clash which sparked on the night of 
17 July, 1999, Moses Ogunlana, the Lisa of Shagamu and Chairman, reported 
during a press conference that one hundred Shagamu indigenes were killed and 
over 120 vehicles belonging to them were burnt by the Hausas at the Sabo, a 
Hausa inhabitant in Shagamu. He also stated that over 130 indigenes were in 
critical condition in various hospitals across the town
90
. On the other hand, the 
Hausas were said to have lost not less than 50 people. Ogunlana went further 
stated that, over 2000 Shagamu indigenes had also fled the town
91
. Subsequently, 
in August 1999, a serious clash erupted between the Hausas and the Yorubas, this 
time around in Northern city of Kano. The clash was a reprisal of the earlier clash 
between the two ethnic groups in Shagamu, July 15. The clash saw the exodus of 
large number of Hausa to the Northern part where they came from. Some reports 
gathered that two trailer loads of corpses and survivors and the clash, arrived 
Kano on 25 July and were paraded at Kantin Kwari, the most populated 
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commercial area in Kano. The tale of the survivors’ violent experiences at the 
hands of the Yorubas in Shagamu further infuriated the youths of Kano. Angered 
by the horrific tale, the youths went on rampage, thereby attacking and killing the 
Yoruba residents in Kano. The aftermath resulted in the loss of lives, 50 houses 
and shops were torched and about 30 vehicles belonging to Yorubas were 
destroyed
92
. 
3:2.7 Supporting of Afghanistan 2001 
On Friday 12 October 2001, a planned peaceful demonstration to protest against 
the US strikes in Afghanistan turned into horrifying ethno-religious killings. The 
government was widely criticized for this uprising due to negligence and lack of 
concern. The press and the government had initially attributed the crisis to 
Muslim fundamentalist; however, later findings showed that, the city was for 
sometime before the incident under tension and at almost point of eruption. 
Government negligence to take preemptive measures paved way for this 
uprising
93
. 
The bombing of Afghanistan by the combined forces of the United States and 
Britain had resulted in worldwide anti-American and pro-Afghanistan across the 
globe and Kano was no exception. Many countries threw their support behind the 
US due to President Bush’s statement: “if you are not with us, you are with 
terrorists” and Nigeria, through its foreign minister, supported America’s war on 
terror.
94
 Unfortunately, the foreign minister Sule Lamido is from Jigawa State, 
one of states that strongly condemned US air raid on Afghanistan. His comments 
were further aired on local and international media, provoking many Muslims and 
paved way for demonstrations in Kano and Jigawa States. Muslims viewed and 
interpreted his comments as follows: 
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Seen as a full-blooded Muslim, representing his Muslim dominated constituency 
in Jigawa state, Lamido’s statement that Nigeria supports the attacked on fellow 
Muslims in Afghanistan was seen by many people in Kano and Jigawa states as a 
betrayal of their trust. All sorts of attacks were made on the minister to the extent 
of attacking his residence in Jigawa State
95
. 
The official report said that, 32 people were killed including one Policeman, 51 
injured; about 35 houses and 30 shops were burnt. It also reported one Mosque 
and 4 Churches were also burnt. About 286 people were arrested in connection 
with the violence. But on the contrary, the Christian Association of Nigeria 
(CAN) Kano branch declared 600 Christian went missing
96
. 
3:3.1 The Plateau/Jos Mayhem 
In September 2001, Jos the capital of Plateau state in the central Northern Nigeria 
witnessed devastating mayhem which resulted in many lost lives and properties of 
its citizenry. Like any other ethno-religious violence in Northern Nigeria, the 
conflict erupted between the indigenous Christians communities of Biron, 
Afizere, Anaguta and Jarawa on one side and the Hausa and Fulani Muslims on 
the other. The incident shocked many Nigerians as Jos was known as home of 
“peace and tourism”; nobody expected such a carnage would manifest itself in 
this peaceful state, where Christians and Muslims lived side by side in peace and 
harmony. This also made people to be asking question like “If this could happen 
in Jos, then nowhere is safe in Nigeria”97. 
Plateau state, or Jos town in particular, has witnessed several outbreaks of 
communal violence, most especially between 1991 and 2007. But to a larger 
extent, Jos has been a center of deep-seated animosities and rivalry between the 
Hausa/Fulani who were considered as “settlers” and the indigenous communities. 
Sometimes, tension between them escalates into overt crisis. This situation has 
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existed since the colonial period; however, despite the disaffection and rivalry, 
there are the questions of disproportionate access to socio-economic resources, 
power and land. The state and ruling class manipulation of these differences and 
“partisan handling of situation in the past” exacerbated the differences of the 
past
98
. The state has witnessed ethnic violence in the past, which later manifested 
into religious conflicts but not as terrible and horrific as the Muslim-Christian 
confrontation in Kafanchan, Bauchi, Zangon-Kataf and Kaduna among others
99
. 
At this juncture, it is very important to briefly trace how Jos and its surroundings 
became multi-cultural. The emergence of different ethnic groups can be traced 
back to the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries when migration took place with the 
establishment of tin mining industry in plateau and the need to mobilize large 
labor force. For reasons of labor rate, taxation and forced labor migration, people 
migrated to Plateau from Niger Republic, Borno, Chad, Kano and other areas
100
. 
It was reported that, in the early 1940s, the colonial state forcefully recruited 
workers from Bauchi, Borno, Kano, Katsina, Sokoto and Zaria province. The 
majority of the labor migrants are from the Northern part of Nigeria. However, 
irrespective of their ethnic origins, but for being Muslims, they were all regarded 
as Hausa-Fulani. There are other settlers from the Southern part of the country 
including Yoruba and the Igbo peoples. 
The colonial political policies empowered the Hausa-Fulani traditional political 
system due to indirect rule and the consequent placement of Jos under the Bauchi 
emirate, a position that gave the Hausa-Fulani the political, economic and social 
advantage over the indigenous Christian population
101
. This situation further 
created tension between the two groups most especially in the 1930s. It was 
reported that in 1932, this tense political situation almost erupted into violent 
confrontation between the Hausa-Fulani and the indigenes. 
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After the collapse of the mining industry in Plateau state, the relationship between 
these two communities degenerated, as many of the migrant miners shifted to 
agriculture thereby incubating land conflict. According to Nnoli, Jos has 
witnessed 76 % rural-urban migration between 1952 and 1963 and was one of the 
major cradles of ethnicity as was Kano, Zaria and Kaduna
102
. The land, however, 
became a serious issue and the ownership of Jos becomes a serious political issue. 
Biron and other indigenous ethnic groups claimed the ownership of Jos along with 
the Hausa-Fulani settlers who had been producing traditional rulers until 1950s 
when Sardauna, Ahmadu Bello, for political reasons decided to appoint Mr. 
Rwang Pam as the head of the traditional institution. The hitherto situation since 
then had continue to create tension between the two contending forces who uses 
religion and ethnicity to mobilize support. The post colonial period was greeted 
by forming of several ethnic and religious associations (for example, Berom 
Youth Movement, Jassawa Development Association, Berom Elders Council, to 
name a few)
103
. 
The 1990s was a period characterized be identity politics and for many; this is 
demonstrated by the creation of Jos North Local Government or splitting of Jos 
into South and North during the local government creation of 1991. These actions 
by the federal government worsened the already existing tension in Jos, as the 
Hausa-Fulani were seen to be given impetus to control Jos over the native 
indigenes. The indigenes protest was in line with hitherto Hausa dominance, 
according to Egwu: “the British appointed 12 successive persons as Sarkin Jos 
who was of Hausa-Fulani origins
104
.  
In April, 1994, the growing tension further escalated into violent clashes. The 
immediate cause of the conflict started with the appointment of members of Jos 
North Local Government Management Committee. The appointment of Sanusi 
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Mato, a Hausa-Fulani man, as chairman was greeted with large protest and 
resentment. The indigenes reacted accordingly, as Sha noted: 
The indigenes interpreted this action as a confirmation of the fear that the 
Federal Government wanted to provide basis for the Hausa/Fulani to assume 
political hegemony in Jos. They also interpreted this action supportive of the 
claims that Jos belongs to the Hausa/Fulani
105
. 
On the 5
th
 April, the indigenous youths staged a protest and on the 8
th
 April, went 
on rampage by storming the venue of the swearing in ceremony chanting war 
songs, they stoned the governor’s entourage and burnt government properties and 
this let to halting of Mato’s appointment by Governor Col. Mana. On the other 
hand, the halting of Sanusi Mato’s appointment was considered unacceptable by 
the Hausa-Fulani. They justified his appointment on the basis that the ‘Hausa-
Fulani were numerically superior in the local government council, a notion the 
indigenes vehemently rejected”106.  The situation generated into chaos and 
violence in the city of Jos, resulting to the destruction of properties and the death 
of four people. Part of Jos Ultra-Modern market, The Gada Biyu market and an 
Islamic school and Mosque along Rukuba Road was destroyed
107
. 
March 16
th
, 1996, again saw more violence in Anguwar Rogo, a predominantly 
Hausa settlement, that almost escalated to ethno-religious violence. The indigenes 
allegedly accused the Hausa-Fulani of trying to rig an election by smuggling into 
the pulling station “Shagari voters” form other part of the country. The electoral 
officer’s decision to screen out the alleged “unknown faces” was protested by the 
Hausa-Fulani residents of the area
108
. It was this incident that transformed into 
violence in which dangerous weapons were openly and freely used. In the 
aftermath, one man, an ethnic of Anaguta was killed instantly while two others 
died later at the Jos Teaching Hospital. The burial of the first victim on the 22
nd
 of 
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March, 1996 was used for political mobilization, but the situation was somehow 
contained. Many analysts maintained that, the September 7
th
 violence took its 
roots from the following historical accounts
109
. 
The September 7
th
 Violence came as no surprise following the activities that 
preceded it but the crisis is solely related to the blocking of roads during worship 
periods. Human Rights Watch graphically described how it happened
110
: 
On September 7
th
, a young Christian woman tried to cross the road through a 
congregation of Muslims outside the Mosque (in an area known as Congo-Russia) 
she was asked to wait until prayers had finished or to choose another route, but 
she refused and an argument developed between her and some members of the 
congregation. Within minutes, the argument had unleashed a violent battle 
between groups of Christians who appeared at the scene of the Mosque and the 
Muslims who had been praying in the Mosque or who had happened to be in the 
neighborhood
111
 
112
. 
The ravaging chaos spread to another part of the city and the violence lasted from 
7
th
 to 10
th
 September.  The proposed ceasefire failed and the fighting continued 
until the early hours of 13
th
 when it eventually stopped. At the end of the crisis, 
hundreds of people had been killed: Human Rights Watch reported 1,000 deaths 
and as usual, the state government provided a lower figure. Thousands of homes, 
buildings, shops and worships places were destroyed
113
.  
Sadly also on the early hours of Sunday, March 7, 2010, was another day of 
immense horror in the history of Jos when suspected Fulani herdsmen invaded 
Dogo-Nahawa and three other neighboring villages en masse,  killing hundreds of 
people. Other communities attacked were Zot, Reput and Kutgot, all in Shen 
district of Jos South Local Government Area, populated by Birom people. Dogo-
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Nahawa was ruined and the people were in grief for their losses. On March 8, 400 
corpses of the victims were arraigned for mass burial amidst uncontrollable tears 
form family members and sympathizers
114
. This incident aggrieved the youths and 
took to the streets despite government appeal. People protested with banners and 
placards with carried signs like “Genocide: Hausa-Fulani killed 400 Christians in 
Dogo-Nahawa”115. 
Ever since, Plateau state has become a flashpoint and a conflict zone in the 
Northern part of Nigeria. Violence has become the order of the day in this once 
peace and tourism state, where a series of clashes and counter-attacks are now 
mainstays of the state. 
3:4.1 The Kaduna Crisis 
Kaduna State is one of the volatile states in Northern Nigeria. Kaduna State 
occupies part of the central position of the Northern part of Nigeria and shares 
common borders with Zamfara, Kastina, Niger, Kano, Bauchi, Plateau states and 
the Federal Capital Territory Abuja in the South-West.  
Kaduna state had experience series of complex violent conflicts which mostly 
assumed ethnic and religious character. The recent conflicts includes: Kasuwar 
Magani 1980, Zangon Kataf 1984, Kafanchan 1987 Zangon Kataf and its splits 
over to Kaduna and Zaria 1992, Kaduna and Kachiya 2000, Gwandu 2001 and 
other pockets of violence across the state. The conflict had always been between 
the Hausa-Fulani Muslims and the Christians minorities from Southern Kaduna. 
History has recorded long animosities between the two communities arising from 
pre-colonial political structure of Hausa land and the character of the colonial and 
post-colonial Nigerian states. The conflicts have been reinforced by the economic 
imbalance between the two communities right from the colonial era. The Southern 
Kaduna people strongly argued that the underdevelopment of their communities is 
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a result of deliberate and persistent neglect by the emirate officials who until 1976 
local government reform dominated the system of native administration
116
.  On 
the other hand, the officials attributed the underdevelopment to the sparse 
population of the area and their lack of viable internal sources of revenue. 
These socio-cultural differences have often escalated into violence since the 
colonial period. C.S Whitaker Suberu maintained that at different times during the 
1946-66, riots were staged by the Kataf and other related communities in 
Southern Zaria province over certain oppressive features of the emirate system, 
most especially of Fulani ruling families over predominantly districts. By the year 
1942, the Kaje ethnic group of Zangon Kataf district protested over perceived 
ascendency and discrimination by the native authority who favored the 
Hausa/Fulani over the Christian minorities. Another similar protest also took 
place in 1948, and this time it involved the Zangon Kataf ethnic tribe. Yahaya 
opined that, these protests were the beginning of what become a continuous 
demand for political recognition and participation by the Southern Zaria ethnic 
minorities
117
. 
The 1980s saw the rise of religious fundamentalism, with influx of foreign 
influence, ideological and material, on Muslims and equally on the Christians
118
. 
The patronage of sectarian ethnic and religious organizations further escalated the 
division among people. Also the regime of both Babangida and Sani Abacha 
worsened the situation by supporting or favoring one group over another in order 
to gain support and legitimacy for their regimes. The regimes had also made 
ethno-religious bases very relevant in the recruitment of their agents. The 
Babangida regime for instance had witnessed a growing ethno-religious tension, 
and conflicts
119
. 
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3:4.2. Kaduna Crisis (1987) 
The Kafanchan Riot of March 1987 was another crisis which started as a result of 
disagreement between the Christian and Muslim students of the Kafanchan 
Teachers Collage of Education in Southern Kaduna
120
 
Toure opined that, the 1980s, the Kaduna conflict took a different dimension of 
Muslims versus Christian dichotomy which escalated into violent conflict
121
. The 
conflict of May, 1987 was a watershed in the history of ethno-religious violence 
in Northern Nigeria. It was these conflicts that transmogrify from ethnic to 
religious based conflict. For the first time a conflict which arose from religion, 
spread to other predominantly Muslim and Christian areas of influence. The 
conflict resulted in many losses of lives and properties, burning of religious places 
and as well created high level of insecurity over who lived where and what one’s 
neighbor is. The Nigerian press did not help matters as most of their information 
was distorted, thereby creating more tension among the general population
122
. 
This disagreement commenced as a result of a quarrel between the Fellowship of 
Christian Student (FCS) and the Muslim Student Society (MSS) over an 
evangelical campaign organized by the former and tagged “Mission 87 in Jesus 
Campus”. The latter group protested and asked for the removal of the banner from 
the college gate. It took the intervention of the school authority to calm down the 
situation
123
. 
Ibrahim Bako, a covert, and leading member and activist of the ‘Born Again” 
group was accused by a Muslim woman, Aishatu Garba and a member MSS of 
deliberately misinterpreting the ‘Quran’. The following day, the Muslims staged a 
protest which unfortunately turn into violence and later transformed into religious 
conflict. The confrontation was between the Hausa/Fulani Muslim “settlers” and 
the indigenous ethnic minority groups who were Christians. Subsequently, the 
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violence sprawled to neighboring Zaria, Funtua, Kankia, Daura and other areas 
around Kaduna
124
. The conflict claimed over 19 lives and 61 injured. Also 152 
Churches, 5 Mosques were destroyed and 169 hotels and beer parlors were burnt 
to ashes. A total of 95 vehicles and 152 private buildings were severely 
damaged
125
.  
3:4.3. Kaduna/Zangon Kataf 
In the town of Zangon Kataf, a dispute over land between the predominantly 
Christian Kataf and Muslims Hausa ethnic groups erupted into “widespread 
killings”126. The conflict started in phases, first at Unguwa-Rohongo, when Katafs 
were allegedly accused of destroying Yam plants belonging to the Hausas. Then 
another incident followed months after again between the Hausas and the Katafs 
over the location of market in the same town
127
. Sheikh Abubakar Gumi, a 
Muslim scholar and the leader of the Izala sec and Peter Jatau the archbishop of 
Kaduna Roman Catholic maintained that the violence sprawled when the army 
brought Muslim bodies from Zangon Kataf
128
. The violence spread to Zaria and 
Kaduna, it is reported that up to 400 people were killed and 247 people were 
arrested in connection with the violence. As usual, it is still unclear how many of 
the dead were Muslims and how many were Christians
129
. The violence of 
Zangon Kataf was widely described by analysts as a clash of a struggle for 
political power as who is to gain an upper hand in the presidential election during 
the transition period under the military
130
. It is uncertain but people believed that 
the violence broke out during the voters’ registration which is conducted by 
National Electoral Commission
131
. To further complicate issues and increase the 
growing hatred of Northern Muslims against the West, Western diplomats 
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evinced that despite the manifestation of religious conflicts, the primary issue was 
power. They further highlighted that despite the fact that Zangon Kataf is 
predominantly Christian community but the political decision-making is made 
and dominated by the Hausa-Muslims
132
. 
3:4.4. The Shariah Crisis 
In 1999 by the Governor of Zamfara State, Alhaji-Ahmed Sani Yerima, 
introduced shariah
133
 law and elevated it above the status of English Common 
law, which formed and shaped the bedrock of the Nigerian Judiciary. This 
transformed into a genesis of chaos and violence across the Northern part of 
Nigeria
134
.  The implementation of Shariah had received a tremendous support 
among Northern Muslims population, and to a larger extent majority assumed that 
it will eradicate corruption and as well help create a more secure society. 
Governor Sani Yerima of Zamfara became popular figure, in the North he was 
considered, a true Muslim and a Jihadist while at the national level he is a rebel 
and controversialist. Yerima’s sudden popularity took a new turn by putting the 
Northern governors under intense pressure to implement Shariah in their 
respective states so as to boost their legitimacy and to further maintain their 
position within the power elites
135
. 
Many states in Northern Nigeria had little or no option than to adopt the 
implementation of Sharia in their various states. Notable among states that 
followed suit are Kano, Sokoto, Kebbi, Yobe and Niger while other constituted 
various committees to look into the matter before taking action
136
.   
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Ahmed Makarfi, the then governor of Kaduna state, decided to weight the issue 
carefully before adopting Shariah. In doing so, he forwarded the matter to Kaduna 
State House of Assembly who later established an eleven member committee to 
deliberate on the applicability or otherwise of Shariah in Kaduna State. The 
Legislative House was divided along religious lines thereby creating tension and 
suspicion among members of the House
137
. 
Series of arguments and counter arguments swept across the Kaduna State House 
of Assembly. The Christians argued that, the motion on was not adequately 
passed in line with the House regulations. They maintained that all the committee 
members were Muslims and will only serve the interest of the Muslims. On the 
other hand, the Muslims countered that, Shariah is a Muslim affair and it should 
be dealt with by the Muslims only. This fuss later led to the inclusion of two 
Christians into the committee which the Christians said was a foul play. This 
incident led to protest by Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) Kaduna branch 
on the fears of the Islamization of the State
138
. 
On February 21, 200 Christian groups protested against the planned 
implementation of Shariah law in the State. The proposed peaceful protests turned 
into violence when protesters and hoodlums clashed.  This sparked off series of 
unprecedented violence across Kaduna town and later to its surroundings in areas 
like: Birnin Gwari, Katchia and many more. 
The violence was so bad that: “the senseless destruction of lives and property 
could not have ordinary abate” despite indefinite notice of restriction imposed on 
the Kano metropolis
139
. The Nigerian police reported in its 2000 report, that 609 
deaths and over 1944 buildings inclusive business areas, residential houses and 
Hotels, were destroyed. A total number of 746 vehicles and about 123 churches 
and 55 Mosques were bunt to ashes
140
. The Kaduna State Government 
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Commission of Enquiry, highlighted in its report that, 1295 people were killed 
and lots of unidentified bodies were also found. The report also estimates 
individual financial losses at N4, 927,306,603.00 while organization suffered an 
all together loss of N1, 44,881,115.00
141
. 
3:5.1 The Religious Crisis in North-Eastern Nigeria 
This is a region that is comprised Borno, Bauchi, Adamawa, Gombe and Yobe 
states. I decided to unite these 5 states under one heading because they are unlike 
Kaduna, Kano and Plateau where most of the violence was between ethnicity and 
religion. But the crisis or violence in the North-East has gone far beyond the 
boundaries of ethnicity and even religion itself to some extent. Ideological 
extremism and Islamic fundamentalism in my observation is what characterized 
this new wave of upheaval. This is something new, not only to other fellow 
Nigerians but to Muslims as well. Its forms and methods has assumed not only 
national borders but international character and had also opened a new chapter in 
Nigerian history. The activities of Nigerian Taliban and Boko Haram go hand in 
hand with the manifestos of International extremist and fundamentalist groups 
like the Taliban and Al-Qaida.  
3:5.2 Nigerian Taliban 
The so called Nigerian Taliban came to the limelight in December 2003 when 
they launched short-lived pockets of rebellion in the semi-desert areas along the 
Nigeria-Niger Republic border and seized a couple of farmlands announcing their 
arrival. They are believed to be affiliated with the Afghan Taliban; they attacked 
several Muslims and the Non-Muslim community. They fought security forces on 
three occasions between 2003 and 2004. On 31
st
 December 2003, about 200 
Taliban members clashed with Police in Geidam and Kanamma towns killing a 
police officer and stole sizeable number of A-47 assault rifles
142
. To further 
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announce their arrival, the group attacked three police stations in Damaturu, Yobe 
state capital and other stations near Maiduguri, the capital of Borno. The group 
insurgence was curtailed after four days of fighting with the Nigerian security 
armed forces.  
In June 2004, four of the accused members were shot dead when trying to jail-
brake the Damaturu prison and in retaliation; the group attacked police stations in 
the town of Bama and Gwoza - all in Borno state killing six people and abducting 
four security personnel. In responding to the attack, the combined forces of police 
and the army were deployed to contain the insurgence and most of the group 
members fled to Mandara Mountains, neighboring Cameroon and Niger 
republic
143
.  During this operation, 28 members of the Taliban including two 
women and a child were killed and 5 others were injured; 13 suspected members 
were arrested in one of their camp. A total of 50 assault rifles and hundreds of 
round ammunitions were recovered by the security forces
144
. 
On 8
th
 October, the Taliban group launched an offensive ambush, attacking on 
patrol men of the Nigerian Police in Kala Balge, near Lake Chad. They instantly 
killed three officers and captured twelve whom they killed later
145
.  
The activity of Borno Taliban was short-lived as they did not enjoy popular 
support from the Muslim communities. I can remember vividly during my under 
graduate studies at the University of Maiduguri, when lots of us were discouraged 
from Islamic duties that might lead us to joining the so called Taliban. It was 
rumored that some Taliban members were said to infiltrate the University Campus 
and some of the students had abandoned their studies to join the Taliban. 
However, their violent activities did not provoke any generalized breakdown of 
relations between Christians and Muslims. 
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3:5.3 Boko Haram 
Between 2006 and 2009, a group believed to be remnants of the previous Taliban 
group re-emerged; primarily under a new banner called ‘Boko Haram’ (Western 
Education is a Sin). Its leader under Mohammed Yusuf showed clearly that it is a 
continuation of the Taliban.  The groups official name is Jama’atu Ahlis Sunnah 
Lidda’awati wal-jihad, an Arabic phrases which means “People Committed to the 
propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad” but popularly known as Boko 
Haram
146
. On 25
th
 July, 2009, the police arrested several members of the alleged 
Boko Haram in Bauchi as a preemptive strike based on intelligence, the report 
showed the members preparing a major assault in the state. The group clashed 
with the police in Borno, protesting the arrest while some of them attacked the 
Dusten Tashi police station in Bauchi but they were repelled by the police and lost 
about 50 men in the struggle
147
.   
Between 26
th
 and 30
th
 July, the group launched a heavy assault on the security 
forces in Bauchi, Borno, Kano and Yobe States. The worse violence was in 
Maiduguri town, which was the headquarters of the sects. On 30
th
 July, the 
combined forces of police and the army stormed the headquarters and captured its 
leader Mohammed Yusuf who was later executed while police custody, hours 
after his arrest. Over 780 bodies were buried in mass graves according to a Red 
Cross report
148
. About 29 churches were burnt; three pastors and 28 police 
officers were killed. 
This event marked the beginning of a new wave of insurgence in Northern 
Nigerian history and the nation at large. Unlike other forms of violence in 
Nigeria, the Boko Haram since then has continued tormenting the entire 
population of Nigeria. The following is the chronology the activities of the Boko 
Haram according to Sun News Paper: 
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 26 July, 2009, first clash with the police and other security agencies in Bauchi 
state. 50 members, 2 policemen and one soldier killed. 
 27 July, 2009, first attack in Yobe state during an invasion of Potiskum police 
Divisional headquarters killing three policemen and one fire service officer. 
 29 July, 2009, confrontation with the security forces in Mamudo village along 
Potiskum-Damaturu Road. 33 Boko Haram members were killed. 
 September 8, 2010, set ablaze Bauchi central prison and freed its jailed members 
and 700 others. 
 28 January, 2011, killed governorship candidate of the Borno state chapter of the 
All Nigerian People’s Party (ANPP), Modu Fannami Gubio and six others. 
 2 March, 2011, killed two policemen attached to the residence of a Divisional 
Police Officer (DPO) in Kaduna. 
 9 April, 2011, Polling station center was bombed and on 15 April, they bombed 
the office of the Independent national Electorate Commission, several people 
were shot at close range. 
 22 April 2011, Boko Haram freed 14 prisoners from Yola prison in Adamawa 
state. 
 29 may 2011, killed 15 people across the Northern part in separate attacks. 
 17 June, 2011, a suspected Boko Haram suicide bomber detonated himself inside 
the Police headquarters in the Federal Capital Abuja. This mission was said o the 
first suicide bombing in Nigeria. 
 26 June, 2011, about 25 people were killed in Wulari area of Maiduguri town as a 
result of bomb attacked. 
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 26 August, 2011, The United Nation head office in Abuja was bombed killing 21 
of its staff
149
. 
This is however, not the full list of attacks and killings of Boko Haram.  
The ideology of Boko Haram is based on eradication of Western education, 
culture and modern science. The group rejects secularism, which is seen as 
incompatible with Islamic ideology, and as such vow to Islamize the Northern 
part of Nigeria. 
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Chapter Four 
4:1 Phases of Ethno-Religious Conflicts/Violence in Northern Nigeria 
To properly understand the complex nature of ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria, 
it is imperative at this juncture for the writer to divide or classify the conflicting 
groups into different categories based on a number of factors. These categories 
are: 
 Intra-ethnic and religion: This refers to misunderstanding and disagreement 
within the same ethnic or religious affiliation which sometimes leads to violent 
clashes. A good example of this is the continual communal clash between Fulani 
farmers and the cattle hearers or between the Izala and Tijjaniyya sects and 
between liberals and fundamentalists. 
 Inter-ethnic: This refers to tensions between two separate ethnic groups like 
Hausa vs Igbos 
 Inter-religious: This mainly between two religious groups for instance 
Christianity against the Islam 
 Minority Vs Majority:  This refers to the tension between the dominant groups 
and the minority group e.g. Hausa/Fulani vs. kataf, tiv, jukun and many more 
across the Northern part of Nigeria. 
 Other group Vs State; This involves the tension between the state and the various 
groups within the state. 
The diagram below show how the different parties involved in the conflict inter-set with 
one another. The point of intersection served as the flash points that created conflict 
between two or more parties. 
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Diagram created by the author. 
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Created by the author: 
The above diagram shows the onion like nature of how the various actors involved in 
the ethno-religious conflicts relate and saddle on each other. This implies that no actor 
is isolated or independent from one another. 
4:2 Actors Involved in the Conflicts 
The tension of ethno-religious conflict in Northern Nigeria is ignited by the 
following actors involved in the conflict: 
 The Government of Nigeria 
56 
 
 Religious Bodies and affiliations e.g. CAN and Jama’atu Nasarul Islam 
 Ethnic groups and affiliations e.g. Arewa Consultative Forum, Odudua People’s 
congress, Ohameze and many more. 
 Student groups like; MSS, CSA, Almajirais. 
 International Organizations like Alshabab and Al-Qaida 
4:3 Factors Influencing Ethno-Religious Violence 
The factors influencing ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria have been attributed 
by many scholars to the failure of political elites to accept and practice democratic 
ethics and principles of justice, equity, accountability and the rule of law
150
 
151
. 
Religion and ethnicity has been an integral part of Nigerian society and as such, 
becomes a critical factor in ethno-religious conflict. Many analysts have attributed 
the conflicts in the far North to ethnic and religious differences. This difference 
has to do with, accusations and allegations of neglect, exploitation, oppression, 
discrimination, victimization, marginalization, bigotry and nepotism. In Nigeria, 
just like any other nation, there is no fair agreement based on justice and equality 
on how wealth, power and status are to be shared among individuals and groups.  
For better understanding the causes of ethno-religious violence in Northern 
Nigeria and Nigeria as whole, it will be more appropriate to categorize this vast 
topic into the following sub headings: 
4:3.2 Political Factor 
 The most intriguing and widely acknowledge factor influencing conflict 
undoubtedly and unarguably is politics and the role of political elites who invoke 
ethnicity and religious mobilization to gain political power. Indeed most of the 
ethno-religious crisis can be traced back or attributed to this cause. The failure of 
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the Nigerian leaders to establish good governance, foster national unity and 
integration and the will to promote real economic growth through just and well 
articulated policies, has no doubt led to mass poverty and a high rate of 
unemployment. It is this failure and negligence that culminated into the 
communal, religious and ethnic conflict that has now characterized the Nigerian 
polity. Idealness, despair and loss of hope are the products of absolute poverty 
and high rate of unemployment have left people with little or no choice other than 
to indulge in crimes.  
The long years of military rule encouraged and legalized the use of force and 
violence against any group, tribe or its affiliates in order to implement the so-
called social change and attainment of set goals and demands. And unfortunately, 
the return to democracy did not help the situation but instead worsened the 
situation even more, through power sharing, and election malpractices. Some 
Nigerians shared the opinion that, there is no religious crisis but access to power 
and credible system of sharing power. According to Lewis; “The widespread 
election irregularities and perception that the vote was manipulated by political 
elites using patronage and violence to gain office has produced an atmosphere of 
resignation cynicism”152. Hilary Clinton also highlighted and attributed ethno-
religious conflicts to governments neglect; she said that  
“The most immediate source of the disconnected between Nigeria’s wealth and its 
poverty is the failure of governance at the federal, state and the local levels…. 
Lack of transparency and accountability has eroded the legitimacy of the 
government and contributed to the rise of groups that embrace violence and reject 
the authority of the state”153. 
 Other scholars like Lake and Rothschild, maintained that, ethnic conflict is one of 
the major indicator of a weak and failed state that is embroiled in ancient ties or 
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loyalty
154
. They further explained that, any state that acts with bias intention to 
favor one particular ethnic or region, and as well behaviors like preferential 
treatment fuel nothing but ethnic conflicts. In a multi-ethnic society like Nigeria, 
the struggle to control state policy produces competing communal interest, 
thereby paving way for each ethno-regional group to turn to the state to favor it 
when distributing public resources or producing it
155
. Claude Ake puts it rightly 
by saying; “overpoliticization” of social life gravely weakens the state156. 
4:3.3 Economic Factor 
The economic factor has been identified by many as a one of the main major 
causes of ethno-religious conflicts in Northern Nigerian and even beyond. Many 
theorists opined that competition over scares resources is always a driving factor 
that fuel and breeds violence. Northern Nigeria or Nigeria just like any other 
multi-ethnic societies in Africa, Ethnic and even sometimes religious 
communities tend to violently compete for property rights, social amenities, 
health care facilities, jobs, education and most controversial cultural or linguistic 
dominance. According to J. Furnivall, “the working of economic forces makes for 
tension between groups with competing interest”157. The economic factor, 
however triggered the explosion of the social starter of traditional African 
societies which characterized as,  the family, religion, education, law and at large, 
the political system that cared for the well being of all citizens. Certainly, the 
disintegration and malfunction of all these vital institutions has evidently 
increased ethnic and religious conflicts in Northern Nigeria. The inability of many 
families to adequately feed themselves, results in divorce, immorality, 
drunkenness, idleness and broken homes. This by and large, leads to large reserve 
of youth who could easily be recruited for the execution of ethnic or religious 
violence. Lack of proper education and the poor state of Nigerian educational 
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system has enormously contributed to this calamity
158
. The religious institution 
preached more of hate and disunity messages than love and unity. The 
culmination of economic and social factors further encourages social vices in the 
society thereby laying the foundations for violent conflicts. 
4:3.4 Colonial Legacy 
The growth of ethno-religious conflict in Nigeria has its foundation from the 
activities and legacies of the colonial master. The annexation of Lagos with 
gunboat in 1861, Yorubaland in 1898, Kanem Borno in 1902 and Sokoto 
caliphate in 1903 paved way for British full control of what later become Nigeria 
in 1914. The British colonial rule is no doubt the most important factor for 
analyzing the contemporary identities and religious conflicts in Nigeria. The 
colonial masters regrouped Nigerians into a culturally artificial political entity, for 
example, they encouraged and promoted steady completion and mobilization of 
power and resources in the newly created states, thereby breeding ethnic and 
religious conflicts. The colonial urban centers are very fundamental in the 
creation of ethnic contacts, completion, consciousness and 
organization/mobilization. These urban centers mainly comprises of colonial 
cities, mining, commercial and administrative cities, they encourage formation of 
kingship, lineage and ethnic associations as a means to fight insecurity, instability, 
alienation and challenges of colonial urban city life
159
 
160
. 
The British through the indirect rule system
161
  fostered an uneven socio-
economic and political development and mal-integration of the various Nigerian 
people. For instance, Christian missionaries were barred from any activity in 
Northern Nigeria; the highly priced missionary schools were not build in the 
North, This activity undoubtedly created a huge educational imbalance. The 
British also promoted officially the segregation of residential settlement based on 
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ethnicity and religion. The establishment of Federal structure of three units, 
thereby diving the country into three ethnically dimensional parts (North/Hausas, 
West/Yoruba’s and East/Igbo’s), created tensions not only among the three 
dominant groups but also a system that marginalizes the minorities. 
4:3.5 International Influence 
Globalization has turned the world into a global village and as such no single 
event is entirely on its own, so therefore, the ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria is 
no exception and has connection with a number of politico-religious 
developments across the globe. Most scholars believed that the religious crisis in 
Nigeria traces its origin from the Middle-East, according to Albert, religion and 
matters of religion has become phenomenal since the end of cold war
162
. He 
shared a similar view with Huntington and in conformity with Fukuyama; 
Huntington strongly believed that while the age of ideology had ended, the world 
had only reverted to a normal state of affairs characterized by cultural and 
religious conflict. In his writings, he argued that the primary flash point of 
conflict in the future would be along cultural and religious fault lines
163
. He 
further postulates that the concept of different civilizations, as the highest rank of 
cultural identity, will become a much more relevant and useful tool for analyzing 
the potential for conflict. This new or post cold war era has seen the rise of 
Islamic ideology, Muslims across the globe and particularly those in the Middle-
East seemed more determine to deter and resent the socio-economic inequality 
and psychological alienation that rose from the failed modernization and 
excessive westernization in the post cold war era
164
. 
It is very important to note that the problems and tension created by the Islamic 
ideology are not only limited to the Middle-East but also to the developing world 
where they share the same feeling of deprivation and alienation. It was this reason 
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that bred religious violence in Nigeria with solidarity and help of external fund, 
forces and connections. The foreign connection is evident in the involvement of 
non-Nigerians in a number of insurgences across the country. Boko Haram 
recently claimed that their fighters were trained in Somalia by the dreaded 
Alshabab group. Some foreign preachers also contribute to the escalation of 
religious violence in Nigeria, a classical example is that of Rev. Richard Bonnke 
who planned on conducting a crusade tagged “Kano for Jesus” in Kano of all 
places
165
. 
4:3.5 Other Influencing Factors 
Environmental and demographic factors also play a vital role in fuelling ethno-
religious conflicts in Northern Nigeria, or I can say Nigeria as a whole. The 
Sahalian drought of the 1970s and 1980s and coupled with the subsequent desert 
encroachment and desertification have adversely abated the grazing land and 
almost if not completely destroyed pastoral livelihood and as well aggravated 
food, water and insecurity. This trend has led to displacement of many from 
neighboring Niger Republic, Chad and the far areas of Northern Nigerian into a 
precarious existence in urban slums across lager cities like Kano, Maiduguri, 
Sokoto, Kastina, Bauchi, Yola and other towns as well. The population of 
Northern cities has pranged up, thereby accommodating lots of foreigners. Some 
of the notorious and adherents of ethno-religious violence in Nigeria are not even 
Nigerians. For example, Mohammed Marwa Maitastine, who is reported to have, 
came from Cameroun and Mohammed Yusuf the leader of the Boko Haram sect 
who many said he came from Niger Republic. 
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4:4 Impacts/Consequences of Ethno-Religious Conflicts 
4:4.1 Political Impact 
The under-current ethno-religious conflict in Northern Nigeria has severely 
affected the political stability of not only the region but the country at large. 
Political stability refers to the ability of any political system to maintain poise all 
its ramifications. It also implies the ability of an eligible government to preserve 
and carry out its required duties and retaining the support of its people within the 
framework of the established system
166
. The ubiquitous nature of ethno-religious 
crises, which resulted to widespread of breakdown of law and order, reflects 
clearly the failure of all the three tiers government (local, state and federal). The 
under-current situation also reflects the inability and ineffectiveness of the 
governments to put in place effective and viable measure that will guarantee 
security and well being of the people. And therefore, this prevalence has no doubt 
remained a major source of political instability in Nigerian history. 
It is important to note that, the phenomenon of ethno-religious conflict poses 
severe threats to the peaceful co-existence, political stability, meaningful 
development and, ultimately, to the national security of the people and Nigerian 
polity at large. People no longer have faith in the government; this resulted in 
people taking law into their own hands by taking up arms in the name of self-
defense.  
Nigeria’s nascent democracy has badly been affected by the catastrophe of ethnic 
and religious violence. In 1999, Nigeria return to civilian rule after 15 years of 
long unbroken military dictatorships, hopes were very high that democracy would 
restore political stability cum rapid economic growth. But unfortunately, 
Nigeria’s democracy was characterized by high rise in ethnic and religious 
violence; it was estimated that more than 20,000 had been killed in clashes mainly 
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related to ethnic and religious groups across Nigeria and as well displaced over a 
million people
167
.  
4:4.2 Economic Impact 
There is no doubt that economic activities have been seriously hampered by the 
scourge of ethno-religious conflicts. Many people have lost their lives and 
properties, while many completely lost their sources of livelihood, thereby 
increasing the already saturated labor market and unemployment. Many resources 
that were meant for developmental projects were diverted to relief services and 
deployment of security personnel. Most Igbo people have retreated back to their 
homeland in the South thereby creating a very vast economic vacuum in the 
North. 
 
4:4.3 Social Impact 
I remember growing up in the Northern Nigeria and how peacefully and 
harmoniously we used to live. There is no hatred or tension between ethnicity and 
religion among people, Christians and Muslims, Hausa and Igbo celebrate 
functions together, be it Sallah or Esther and Christmas. We very closely share 
almost everything around us. But unfortunately, things have now changed 
drastically, people no longer celebrate things together, neighborhoods are now 
separated according to religion and ethnicity. The recent ethno-religious conflicts 
have affected enormously the social strata in Nigeria. People are displaced and 
many have resorted to going back to their roots and the only few that stayed 
happened send their families away to other part of Nigeria where tensions are less. 
Social functions are now restricted to religion and ethnicity. 
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4:4.4 Impact on National Security 
The failure of government to effectively perform its primary duty of providing 
and guaranteeing the security of the lives and property of its people has drastically 
affected its bargaining power and capacity to deal with ethno-religious conflicts 
and this severely threatens national security. In lieu of this, loyalty to ethnicity or 
religion is being placed by the people far and above loyalty to the state. 
The volatile nature of ethno-religious violence has also effectively undermined 
the core duty of the Nigerian Police and other security agencies. For instance, 
attacks on police stations and outposts have led to the killing of many police 
officers, vandalizing of security facilities and looting of armories, which often fall 
into the wrongs hands. Most worrisome is the example of the recent conflict in 
Libya, where large stocks of arms went missing and certainly, the larger part of it 
is in the wrong hand
168
. 
Chapter Five 
5:1 The Way Forward 
The various cases of ethno-religious violence in Northern Nigeria as studied in 
this thesis show clearly that the recurrence of ethno-religious conflicts are many 
and increasing daily in numbers. The prevalence of ethno-religious conflicts and 
its damaging impact on the socio-economic well being of the Nigerian people 
have vigorously challenged the government and have thus demanded one form of 
solution or the other in other to put things under control. The Nigerian 
government both past and the present have been responding to the challenges 
using various forms and methods with prove unsuccessful. The Nigerian 
government over the years adopted two main strategies of conflict management in 
other to address ethno-religious conflicts in the country. These two methods of 
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conflict management according to Omorogbe and Omohan are: coercive and 
judicial methods
169
.  
The coercive method suggests the deployment of troops to the conflict areas with 
the sole aim of controlling the crisis at all costs. In Nigeria, this method of 
conflict management is considered the most efficient especially during violent 
ethno-religious clashes. For instance, conventional police officers are the first to 
be deployed to the conflict area and further to be assisted by mobile-policemen 
when the corps cannot deal with the situation. However, in an event of severe and 
highly violent ethno-religious conflicts, the Nigerian government always resorts 
to deploying combined forces of the army, navy and the air force to handle the 
situation. This method more often backfires due to the nature of the military and 
their nonchalant attitude, lack of discipline, negligence and total disregard to 
human lives. This method is always associated with controversies ranging from 
severe beatings, rape, disproportionate killings and taking sides in carrying out 
their duties
170
.  
Thus, this method of conflict management cum restoring order during and after 
ethno-religious violence has abruptly failed in bringing peace and stability in the 
Nigerian society. In buttressing the problem of troop’s deployment as a method of 
managing conflict, Oromareghake and Akpator assert that;  
“The problem of with the deployment of security forces that are not backed by 
intensive mediation effort is that it necessarily prolongs the stay of such security 
forces deployed in different parts of Nigeria. This is because the units of mobile 
police or armies frequently deployed to quell disturbances in Nigeria have neither 
the mandate nor the training to act as conflict facilitator”171. 
The above quote implies that, the deployment of troops by the Nigeria 
Government to deal with ethno-religious crises creates more problems than what 
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existed before. The troops lack any method of training of conflict management 
and instead they become part of the problem thereby broadening the conflict. 
The second method of conflict management adopted and practice by the Nigerian 
government is the establishment of judicial commission or panel for managing 
ethno-religious crisis
172
. This method involves selection of people from different 
background to investigate the crisis and submit reports to the government on the 
basis of the terms of reference giving to the panel. More often than not, this 
panel/commissions operates largely calling for memoranda, visitation of affected 
areas and organizing public hearing
173
. 
The judicial method of conflict management has woefully failed to find a lasting 
solution or offer meaningful suggestion of resolving ethno-religious conflicts in 
Northern Nigeria. Most selection of the commission members is based on 
sentiments and interest of a particular group and above all, the reports of the 
commission/panel hardly look upon by the government. Many widely, believed 
that, such commissions are another way of siphoning money from the government 
by corrupt officials
174
. According to Oromareghake and Akpator, this method has 
done more harm than good in managing crisis. They further assert that:  
“…the main reasons for the poor performance of the often used conflict 
management mechanism are poor logistics, delay in deployment of troops to the 
crises areas, lack of cooperation from the parties to the conflicts, non-
implementation of a white paper or recommendations submitted to the 
government by the panel of inquiry”175. 
The above reasons suggest that, the two methods of conflict management used 
constantly by the Nigerian government at different points in conflicts have 
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yielded little in the way of meaningful results in solving effectively the menace 
ethno-religious conflicts. 
It is on the bases of the above discussion that I will like to propose some possible, 
and perhaps suitable solutions to the problems of ethno-religious in Northern part 
and Nigeria as whole. These possible solutions will include different categories of 
the society: the government, religious and social groups, civil society 
organizations and the ordinary people.  
The state is the main actor and holds a very critical role to the construction and 
deconstruction of conflicts in any given society. According to Ibrahim
176
, the state 
system in Nigeria has created an avenue for defining basic terms and structures 
like identity, goals and interests, which all groups seek to pursue and achieve at 
the expense of other groups. He also opined that:  
“The legitimacy of the modern state is linked to its capacity to present itself as a 
provider of public goods and more importantly, a neutral arbiter that guarantees 
the security of all sections of the society. When the state is generally perceived as 
serving the particularistic interest of one group, it starts losing the legitimacy and 
indeed, its authority. As state capacity declines, fear of the other rises and people 
resort to other levels of solidarity-religious, ethnic and regional-in search of 
security”177 
So therefore, the bulky part of the burden lies with the Nigerian government 
because of its legitimacy and capacity as a modern state. For the Nigerian 
government to avoid state failure like Somalia and Afghanistan and as well to 
ensure lasting peace, security and stability, I am suggesting the followings: 
The Nigerian government must adopt a genuine and systematic political culture 
that makes adequate provisions to serve the interests of all groups. Nigeria as a 
democratic state should adhere to the fundamental principles of democracy such 
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as majority rule and it’s complementarity and regards for minority rights. 
Federalism as a system of government is the most viable and suitable one for 
Nigeria to achieve that. The quota system must be abolished completely in order 
for the Nigerian federalism to function effectively. This will prevent domination 
of government and its resource one or few groups at the detriment of all, thereby 
guaranteeing every group access to power and resources. In addition, the rights of 
the ethnic minorities should be acknowledged and respected in the dynamics of 
power and resource sharing.  
Most of the ethnic and religious crises that have plagued Northern Nigeria have 
their roots in, or are closely linked to, poverty and lack of economic self 
determination. The government should do more by creating jobs and viable 
programs for poverty alleviation. Local industries should be supported by loans 
and protected by good policies so they can create more jobs and keep people 
socially responsible and away from the streets. 
The government should, as a matter of urgency, revamp the educational sector 
and policies redressing both Western and religious schools across the country. 
Most especially the issue of the Almajirai
178
 should be adequately addressed, as 
most of the followers and the armies of religious violence come from this group. 
The widening educational gap between the North and Southern Nigeria has to be 
filled by the government, although the colonialists caused this problem. 
The government most but gradually withdraw God from Nigeria’s political 
affairs; that is to say politics must be entirely separated from religion. This will 
further enhance the spirit of oneness and unity among the general population 
without sentiments. 
There also the need to shift from theory to practice, so many things has been 
written on ethno-religious conflict in Nigeria but very little has been done at the 
practical level. There is the need to embark on projects on interethnic and 
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 Almajiri or Almajirai refers to an individual or group of migrant seekers of knowledge. They are mostly found in 
Northern Nigeria. 
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religious conflict resolution, either through seminars, workshops, plays and 
sports. Government should establish conflict resolution centers and institutions 
across the country. Peace and conflict resolution courses should be mandatory in 
schools at all level and scholarships should be awarded to groups and individuals 
to study and attend conferences and seminar related to conflict management and 
resolution. Government should also preach the gospel of non-violent means of 
protest and agitation.  
The NGOs, religious bodies of both Christian and Muslim communities,  as well 
the ordinary Nigerians have a bigger role to play in managing and preventing the 
occurrence of ethno-religious conflicts. The NGOs both local and international 
should work and implement programs that are geared towards peaceful 
coexistence between the various ethnic and religious groups. Religious bodies like 
CAN (Christian Association of Nigeria), ECWA, Jama’atul Nasarul Islam and 
many more have the sole responsibility to preach the gospel of peace and to 
remind its followers that people of various faiths and ethnicities had lived 
peacefully and harmoniously both during the time of Jesus and Mohammed 
(Peace be unto them). 
The press should do more to concentrate mainly on positive rather than negative 
journalism; negative reports should be avoided and certain potentially 
inflammatory comments and images should not be aired to the public. 
And finally, the ordinary citizens should embrace the culture of peace through 
peaceful means. The diagram below shows how collective our responsibility is in 
ensuring lasting peace and stability in our societies. 
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Actors and Approaches to Peacebuilding
Types of Actors Approaches to Building Peace
Level 3: Grassroots leadership
Local leaders. Leaders of 
indigenous NGOS. Community 
developers. Local health 
officials. Refugee camp 
leaders
Local peace commissions. 
Grassroots training.  
Transforming Prejudice.  
Psychosocial work in 
postwar trauma. 
Community-based Peace 
Teams.
Focus on high level negotiation. 
Emphasize cease fire.                 
Lead by highly visible mediator.
Level 1: Top Leadership
Military/ Political/ religious 
leaders with high visibility
Level 2: Middle-range leadership
Leaders respected in sectors.  
Business. NGOs. Ethnic/ religious 
leaders. Academics/ intellectuals. 
Media. Humanitarian leaders.
Problem solving workshops.    
Training in conflict resolution.    
Peace commissions.  Peace 
Journalism. Insider-partial 
teams. EWER.
Track 
1
Track 2
Track 3
D
iagram created by the author: 
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Conclusion 
Ethnicity and religion do not necessarily in themselves manifest into conflicts but 
it is the politicization of these identities that breeds tension and violence. These 
differences in identities become problematic when equal access to fair 
participation in political system in terms of power and equitable resource sharing 
favors one group at the detriment of another in any giving society. The inability of 
the government to adequately perform its duty of protecting and providing its 
citizens with basic societal needs results in tension and lack of trust for the state. 
The Nigerian experience as regards to ethnic and religious conflicts has now 
become a major factor as politics is defined along religion and ethnicity. 
It is argued in this work that some of the major causes of ethno-religious conflict 
in Northern Nigeria are government negligence, a high level of illiteracy, and the 
issue of poverty, which was a result of economic deprivation through state 
policies. Equally, this paper suggested that the best way of resolving this issue is 
through evolution of dynamic policies and implementation that will address the 
problems of education, poverty and social relations within the micro and macro 
society.
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